Diamonds for Security: A Non-Interleaving Operational Semantics for the Applied Pi-Calculus

We introduce a non-interleaving structural operational semantics for the applied ?-calculus and prove that it satisfies the properties expected of a labelled asynchronous transition system (LATS). LATS have well-studied relations with other standard non-interleaving models, such as Mazurkiewicz traces or event structures, and are a natural extension of labelled transition systems where the independence of transitions is made explicit. We build on a considerable body of literature on located semantics for process algebras and adopt a static view on locations to identify the parallel processes that perform a transition. By lifting, in this way, work on CCS and ?-calculus to the applied ?-calculus, we lay down a principled foundation for reusing verification techniques such as partial-order reduction and non-interleaving equivalences in the field of security. The key technical device we develop is the notion of located aliases to refer unambiguously to a specific output originating from a specific process. This light mechanism ensures stability, avoiding disjunctive causality problems that parallel extrusion incurs in similar non-interleaving semantics for the ?-calculus