Pengaruh Struktur Modal dan Mekanisme Corporate Governance terhadap Agency Cost Perusahaan LQ45 di BEI Tahun 2013

As an internal party, manager has more information that can be pushed to benefit himself, at the expense of the principal interests. In the context of agency theory, this conflict of interest raises agency cost, which needs to be reduced. This research examines the effect of capital structure and corporate governance mechanisms in reducing agency cost. Capital structure is tested includes total debt-to-asset ratio and long-term debt-to-asset ratio. Corporate governance mechanisms consist of managerial ownership, institutional ownership, government ownership, the proportion of board of independence commissioners and audit committee. The research object is the companies that at LQ45 index for the year 2013 and data tested using Eviews‘s Ordinary Least Square Test. The results show that only longterm debt-to-asset ratio and the audit committee have significant effects on agency cost (AC), but not in the hypothesized direction. The results show that debt-to-asset ratio and the audit committee have significant effects on agency cost (AC2), but not in the hypothesized direction. For additional testing, i found a significantly negative effect of the long-term debt structure on the agency cost and also moderating effect of government ownership on CG mechanism