Add to ORKGWe propose new point valued solutions for global games. We explore the implications of weakening some of the properties used by Gilboa and Lehrer (1991) in their characterization result. Our main contributions are the axiomatic characterizations of two families of values for global games
We analyze surplus allocation problems where cooperation between agents is restricted both by a comm...
ED EPSInternational audienceThe Shapley value is a central notion defining a rational way to share t...
This thesis focuses on the area of solutions for TU-games, which contains new axiomatic characteriza...
We propose and characterize a new family of Shapley values for games with coalitional externalities....
In this thesis we consider cooperative games with transferable utilities, which are also called TU ...
We consider environments in which agents can cooperate on multiple issues and externalities are pres...
The per capita Shapley support levels value extends the Shapley value to cooperative games with a le...
International audienceGlobal games are real-valued functions defined on partitions (rather than subs...
We consider cooperative environments with externalities (games in partition function form) and provi...
We provide new characterization results for the value of games in partition function form. In partic...
We study three values for transferable utility games with coalition structure, including the Owen co...
We analyze surplus allocation problems where cooperation between agents is restricted both by a comm...
Two well-known single valued solutions for TU-games are the Shapley value and Solidarity value, whic...
For games in partition function form, we explore the implications of distinguishing between the conc...
This is an Accepted Manuscript of a book chapter published by Routledge/CRC Press in Handbook of the...
We analyze surplus allocation problems where cooperation between agents is restricted both by a comm...
ED EPSInternational audienceThe Shapley value is a central notion defining a rational way to share t...
This thesis focuses on the area of solutions for TU-games, which contains new axiomatic characteriza...
We propose and characterize a new family of Shapley values for games with coalitional externalities....
In this thesis we consider cooperative games with transferable utilities, which are also called TU ...
We consider environments in which agents can cooperate on multiple issues and externalities are pres...
The per capita Shapley support levels value extends the Shapley value to cooperative games with a le...
International audienceGlobal games are real-valued functions defined on partitions (rather than subs...
We consider cooperative environments with externalities (games in partition function form) and provi...
We provide new characterization results for the value of games in partition function form. In partic...
We study three values for transferable utility games with coalition structure, including the Owen co...
We analyze surplus allocation problems where cooperation between agents is restricted both by a comm...
Two well-known single valued solutions for TU-games are the Shapley value and Solidarity value, whic...
For games in partition function form, we explore the implications of distinguishing between the conc...
This is an Accepted Manuscript of a book chapter published by Routledge/CRC Press in Handbook of the...
We analyze surplus allocation problems where cooperation between agents is restricted both by a comm...
ED EPSInternational audienceThe Shapley value is a central notion defining a rational way to share t...
This thesis focuses on the area of solutions for TU-games, which contains new axiomatic characteriza...