Add to ORKGWe study the problem of computing optimal prices for a version of the Product-Mix auction with budget constraints. In contrast to the ``standard'' Product-Mix auction, the objective is to maximize revenue instead of social welfare. We prove correctness of an algorithm proposed by Paul Klemperer and DotEcon which is sufficiently efficient in smaller markets
Bayesian auction design investigates how to sell scarce resources to agents with private values draw...
AbstractCombinatorial auctions, that is, auctions where bidders can bid on combinations of items, te...
This dissertation provides a complexity-theoretic critique of Myerson's theorem, one of Mechanism De...
AbstractHow should a seller price her goods in a market where each buyer prefers a single good among...
Abstract. Recently there has been a surge of interest in auctions re-search triggered on the one han...
We consider two classes of optimization problems that emerge in the set up of the reverse auctions (...
Consider the problem of a retailer with various goods for sale, attempting to set prices to maximize...
A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a short-listed set. Items are differentiated...
We consider an environment where potential buyers of an indi- visible good have liquidity constraint...
I study a principal’s optimal choice of constraint for an agent participating in an auction (or auct...
Traditional incentive-compatible auctions [6,16] for selling multiple goods to unconstrained and bud...
This paper develops algorithms to solve strong-substitutes product-mix auctions. That is, it finds c...
The last decade has seen the emergence of auction mechanisms for pricing and allocating goods on the...
We investigate price mechanism selection in a setting where sellers compete for budget constrained b...
<p>We design algorithms for markets consisting of multiple items, and agents with budget constraints...
Bayesian auction design investigates how to sell scarce resources to agents with private values draw...
AbstractCombinatorial auctions, that is, auctions where bidders can bid on combinations of items, te...
This dissertation provides a complexity-theoretic critique of Myerson's theorem, one of Mechanism De...
AbstractHow should a seller price her goods in a market where each buyer prefers a single good among...
Abstract. Recently there has been a surge of interest in auctions re-search triggered on the one han...
We consider two classes of optimization problems that emerge in the set up of the reverse auctions (...
Consider the problem of a retailer with various goods for sale, attempting to set prices to maximize...
A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a short-listed set. Items are differentiated...
We consider an environment where potential buyers of an indi- visible good have liquidity constraint...
I study a principal’s optimal choice of constraint for an agent participating in an auction (or auct...
Traditional incentive-compatible auctions [6,16] for selling multiple goods to unconstrained and bud...
This paper develops algorithms to solve strong-substitutes product-mix auctions. That is, it finds c...
The last decade has seen the emergence of auction mechanisms for pricing and allocating goods on the...
We investigate price mechanism selection in a setting where sellers compete for budget constrained b...
<p>We design algorithms for markets consisting of multiple items, and agents with budget constraints...
Bayesian auction design investigates how to sell scarce resources to agents with private values draw...
AbstractCombinatorial auctions, that is, auctions where bidders can bid on combinations of items, te...
This dissertation provides a complexity-theoretic critique of Myerson's theorem, one of Mechanism De...