Add to ORKGInternational audienceHomomorphic encryption (HE) ensures provable secrecy of data processed in the ciphertext domain. However, it happens that FHE private-key algorithms can be broken by side-channel attacks. We disclose a novel cache-timing attack on the SEAL open-source HE library. It is triggered by a non-constant time Barrett modular multiplication, which is one of the building blocks in SEAL. We both analyze the mathematical conditions upon which the leakage occurs and show the experimental feasibility of the attack
During the last decade, constant-time cryptographic software has quickly transitioned from an academ...
We show in this paper that the isolation characteristic of system virtualization can be bypassed by ...
La cryptographie est omniprésente dans notre monde actuel hyperconnecté, protégeant nos communicatio...
This paper demonstrates the first side-channel attack on homomorphic encryption (HE), which allows c...
Abstract. In this paper, we describe an abstract model of cache timing attacks that can be used for ...
Software implementations of block ciphers are widely used to perform critical operations such as dis...
This book deals with timing attacks on software implementations of encryption algorithms. It describ...
Abstract. This paper describes several novel timing attacks against the common table-driven software...
Side-channel attacks have often proven to have a devastating effect on the security of cryptographic...
International audienceDeployed widely and embedding sensitive data, IoT devices depend on the reliab...
In this paper, we present the first chosen-ciphertext (CC) cache-timing attacks on the reference imp...
Theoretically secure cryptographic algorithms can be vulnerable to attacks due to their implementati...
Abstract. This paper describes several novel timing attacks against the common table-driven software...
Abstract. Formally bounding side-channel leakage is important to bridge the gap between the theory a...
International audienceTiming attacks are among the most devastating side-channel attacks, allowing r...
During the last decade, constant-time cryptographic software has quickly transitioned from an academ...
We show in this paper that the isolation characteristic of system virtualization can be bypassed by ...
La cryptographie est omniprésente dans notre monde actuel hyperconnecté, protégeant nos communicatio...
This paper demonstrates the first side-channel attack on homomorphic encryption (HE), which allows c...
Abstract. In this paper, we describe an abstract model of cache timing attacks that can be used for ...
Software implementations of block ciphers are widely used to perform critical operations such as dis...
This book deals with timing attacks on software implementations of encryption algorithms. It describ...
Abstract. This paper describes several novel timing attacks against the common table-driven software...
Side-channel attacks have often proven to have a devastating effect on the security of cryptographic...
International audienceDeployed widely and embedding sensitive data, IoT devices depend on the reliab...
In this paper, we present the first chosen-ciphertext (CC) cache-timing attacks on the reference imp...
Theoretically secure cryptographic algorithms can be vulnerable to attacks due to their implementati...
Abstract. This paper describes several novel timing attacks against the common table-driven software...
Abstract. Formally bounding side-channel leakage is important to bridge the gap between the theory a...
International audienceTiming attacks are among the most devastating side-channel attacks, allowing r...
During the last decade, constant-time cryptographic software has quickly transitioned from an academ...
We show in this paper that the isolation characteristic of system virtualization can be bypassed by ...
La cryptographie est omniprésente dans notre monde actuel hyperconnecté, protégeant nos communicatio...