Following Shapley [Theory of Measurement of Economic Externalities, Academic Press, New York, 1976], we study the problem of the existence of a Nash Equilibrium (NE) in which each trading post is either active or \u201clegitimately\u201d inactive, and we call it a Shapley NE. We consider an example of an exchange economy, borrowed from Cordella and Gabszewicz [Games Econ. Behav. 22 (1998) 162\u2013169], which satisfies the assumptions of Dubey and Shubik [J. Econ. Theory 17 (1978) 1\u201320], and we show that the trivial equilibrium, the unique NE of the associated strategic market game, is not \u201cvery nice,\u201d in the sense that it is not \u201clegitimately\u201d trivial. This result has the more general implication that, under the Du...
We explore whether competitive outcomes arise in an experimental implementation of a market game, in...
We consider a two period pure exchange economy with a finite number of states of nature at the secon...
Abstract: In an international trading economy where countries behave strategically, this paper provi...
An example of an exchange economy is provided, satisfying all the assumptions as in Dubey-Shubik (19...
An example of an exchange economy is provided, satisfying all of the assumptions of Dubey and Shubik...
International audienceIn this paper, we extend the Shapley-Shubik model to a two period financial ec...
International audienceIn this paper, we extend the Shapley-Shubik model to a two period financial ec...
International audienceIn this paper, we extend the Shapley-Shubik model to a two period financial ec...
International audienceIn this paper, we extend the Shapley-Shubik model to a two period financial ec...
International audienceIn this paper, we extend the Shapley-Shubik model to a two period financial ec...
International audienceIn this paper, we extend the Shapley-Shubik model to a two period financial ec...
Existence of equilibrium is proved for an exchange strategic market game with complete markets. An e...
Existence of equilibrium is proved for an exchange strategic market game with complete markets. An e...
We explore whether competitive outcomes arise in an experimental implementation of a market game, in...
We provide a full characterisation of the set of trading equilibria (in which all goods are traded a...
We explore whether competitive outcomes arise in an experimental implementation of a market game, in...
We consider a two period pure exchange economy with a finite number of states of nature at the secon...
Abstract: In an international trading economy where countries behave strategically, this paper provi...
An example of an exchange economy is provided, satisfying all the assumptions as in Dubey-Shubik (19...
An example of an exchange economy is provided, satisfying all of the assumptions of Dubey and Shubik...
International audienceIn this paper, we extend the Shapley-Shubik model to a two period financial ec...
International audienceIn this paper, we extend the Shapley-Shubik model to a two period financial ec...
International audienceIn this paper, we extend the Shapley-Shubik model to a two period financial ec...
International audienceIn this paper, we extend the Shapley-Shubik model to a two period financial ec...
International audienceIn this paper, we extend the Shapley-Shubik model to a two period financial ec...
International audienceIn this paper, we extend the Shapley-Shubik model to a two period financial ec...
Existence of equilibrium is proved for an exchange strategic market game with complete markets. An e...
Existence of equilibrium is proved for an exchange strategic market game with complete markets. An e...
We explore whether competitive outcomes arise in an experimental implementation of a market game, in...
We provide a full characterisation of the set of trading equilibria (in which all goods are traded a...
We explore whether competitive outcomes arise in an experimental implementation of a market game, in...
We consider a two period pure exchange economy with a finite number of states of nature at the secon...
Abstract: In an international trading economy where countries behave strategically, this paper provi...