Add to ORKGStarting from the premise that expected utility (EU) is the correct criterion of rational preference both in decision cases under certainty and decision cases under risk, I argue that EU theory is a false theory of instrumental rationality. In its place, I argue for a new theory of instrumental rationality, namely expected comparative utility (ECU) theory. I show that in some commonplace decisions under risk, ECU theory delivers different verdicts from those of EU theory
This paper argues in favor of a particular account of decision‐making under normative uncertainty: t...
Neoclassical economists use expected utility theory to explain, predict, and prescribe choices under...
We propose a new measure of deviations from expected utility, given data on economic choices under r...
This paper aims to address the question of how to make rational choices when one is uncertain about ...
In this paper, I argue for a new normative theory of rational choice under risk, namely expected com...
The prevailing view in decision theory is that subjective expected utility theory (hereafter, EU the...
No existing normative decision theory adequately handles risk. Expected Utility Theory is overly res...
We build a satisficing model of choice under risk which embeds Expected Utility Theory (EUT) into a ...
The orthodox theory of instrumental rationality, expected utility (EU) theory, severely restricts th...
We build a satisficing model of probabilistic choice under risk which embeds Expected Utility Theory...
Since vonNeumann and Morgenstern made their contributions, the expected utility criterion (EUC) has ...
The first part of this paper gives an overview of the dominating approach within economic theory on ...
The present contribution examines the emergence of expected utility theory by John von Neumann and O...
Economic explanations tend to view individuals as acting to satisfy their preferences, so that when ...
This paper argues in favor of a particular account of decision‐making under normative uncertainty: t...
Neoclassical economists use expected utility theory to explain, predict, and prescribe choices under...
We propose a new measure of deviations from expected utility, given data on economic choices under r...
This paper aims to address the question of how to make rational choices when one is uncertain about ...
In this paper, I argue for a new normative theory of rational choice under risk, namely expected com...
The prevailing view in decision theory is that subjective expected utility theory (hereafter, EU the...
No existing normative decision theory adequately handles risk. Expected Utility Theory is overly res...
We build a satisficing model of choice under risk which embeds Expected Utility Theory (EUT) into a ...
The orthodox theory of instrumental rationality, expected utility (EU) theory, severely restricts th...
We build a satisficing model of probabilistic choice under risk which embeds Expected Utility Theory...
Since vonNeumann and Morgenstern made their contributions, the expected utility criterion (EUC) has ...
The first part of this paper gives an overview of the dominating approach within economic theory on ...
The present contribution examines the emergence of expected utility theory by John von Neumann and O...
Economic explanations tend to view individuals as acting to satisfy their preferences, so that when ...
This paper argues in favor of a particular account of decision‐making under normative uncertainty: t...
Neoclassical economists use expected utility theory to explain, predict, and prescribe choices under...
We propose a new measure of deviations from expected utility, given data on economic choices under r...