Add to ORKGBarz (2018) contends that there is no specification of the phenomenon of first-person authority that avoids falsity or triviality. This paper offers one. When a subject self-ascribes a current conscious mental state in speech, there is a presumption that what she says is true. To defeat this presumption, one must be able to explain how she has been led astray
In this paper, I reconstruct Davidson’s explanation of first person authority and criticize it in th...
Some self-ascriptions of belief, desire and other attitudes exhibit first-person authority. The aim ...
There is much that I admire in Richard Moran¿s account of how first- person authority may be consist...
Barz (2018) contends that there is no specification of the phenomenon of first-person authority that...
This paper examines theories of first person authority proposed by Dorit Bar-On (2004), Crispin Wrig...
Ordinarily when someone tells us about her psychological states, we presume that she is right. By de...
In this paper, I challlenge David Finkelstein's claim that evidence does not contribute to first-per...
Many philosophical theories of self-knowledge can be understood as attempts to explain why self-ascr...
Abstract: Ordinarily when someone tells us something about her beliefs, desires or intentions, we pr...
The aim of this paper is to analyze Crispin Wright’s constitutivist account of self-knowledge and fi...
Richard Moran’s theory of first-person authority as the agential authority to make up one’s own mind...
This dissertation provides an interpretation and assessment of Donald Davidson\u27s work on first-pe...
In this paper, I reconstruct Davidson’s explanation of first person authority and criticize it in th...
Mental episodes are typically associated with subjective ownership and first-person authority. My be...
In this paper, I reconstruct Davidson’s explanation of first person authority and criticize it in th...
Some self-ascriptions of belief, desire and other attitudes exhibit first-person authority. The aim ...
There is much that I admire in Richard Moran¿s account of how first- person authority may be consist...
Barz (2018) contends that there is no specification of the phenomenon of first-person authority that...
This paper examines theories of first person authority proposed by Dorit Bar-On (2004), Crispin Wrig...
Ordinarily when someone tells us about her psychological states, we presume that she is right. By de...
In this paper, I challlenge David Finkelstein's claim that evidence does not contribute to first-per...
Many philosophical theories of self-knowledge can be understood as attempts to explain why self-ascr...
Abstract: Ordinarily when someone tells us something about her beliefs, desires or intentions, we pr...
The aim of this paper is to analyze Crispin Wright’s constitutivist account of self-knowledge and fi...
Richard Moran’s theory of first-person authority as the agential authority to make up one’s own mind...
This dissertation provides an interpretation and assessment of Donald Davidson\u27s work on first-pe...
In this paper, I reconstruct Davidson’s explanation of first person authority and criticize it in th...
Mental episodes are typically associated with subjective ownership and first-person authority. My be...
In this paper, I reconstruct Davidson’s explanation of first person authority and criticize it in th...
Some self-ascriptions of belief, desire and other attitudes exhibit first-person authority. The aim ...
There is much that I admire in Richard Moran¿s account of how first- person authority may be consist...