Add to ORKGWe show, with an example, that the theorem on the characterization of domains admitting strategy-proof and non-dictatorial social choice functions by Kalai and Muller (1977) does not hold when the set of alternatives is infinite. Then, we introduce a class of social choice functions for which it is possible to restore the validity of the theorem also in this case. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D71
This thesis consists of two separate papers in strategy-proof social choice theory. The first paper,...
Abstract: We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symme...
We define different concepts of group strategy-proofness for social choice functions. We discuss the...
A social choice function may or may not satisfy a desirable property depending on its domain of defi...
We define different concepts of group strategy-proofness for social choice functions. We discuss the...
This thesis makes a contribution to strategy-proof social choice theory, in which one investigates t...
AbstractDomains of generalized single-peaked preferences are classified in terms of the extent to wh...
Domains of social choice functions on which coalition strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity are...
Abstract: A social choice function is group strategy-proof on a domain if no group of agents can man...
We define different concepts of group strategy-proofness for social choice functions. We discuss the...
We generalize the traditional concept of single-peaked preference domains in two ways. First, we int...
We prove a representation formula that gives a new characterization of the coali- tionally strategy ...
Abstract: We consider strategy-proof social choice functions operating on a rich do-main of preferen...
Following "Barberà et al. (1991, Econometrica 59:595-609)", we study rules (or social choice functio...
Serizawa [3] characterized the set of strategy-proof, individually rational, no exploitative, and no...
This thesis consists of two separate papers in strategy-proof social choice theory. The first paper,...
Abstract: We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symme...
We define different concepts of group strategy-proofness for social choice functions. We discuss the...
A social choice function may or may not satisfy a desirable property depending on its domain of defi...
We define different concepts of group strategy-proofness for social choice functions. We discuss the...
This thesis makes a contribution to strategy-proof social choice theory, in which one investigates t...
AbstractDomains of generalized single-peaked preferences are classified in terms of the extent to wh...
Domains of social choice functions on which coalition strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity are...
Abstract: A social choice function is group strategy-proof on a domain if no group of agents can man...
We define different concepts of group strategy-proofness for social choice functions. We discuss the...
We generalize the traditional concept of single-peaked preference domains in two ways. First, we int...
We prove a representation formula that gives a new characterization of the coali- tionally strategy ...
Abstract: We consider strategy-proof social choice functions operating on a rich do-main of preferen...
Following "Barberà et al. (1991, Econometrica 59:595-609)", we study rules (or social choice functio...
Serizawa [3] characterized the set of strategy-proof, individually rational, no exploitative, and no...
This thesis consists of two separate papers in strategy-proof social choice theory. The first paper,...
Abstract: We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symme...
We define different concepts of group strategy-proofness for social choice functions. We discuss the...