Intentionality, Point of View, and the Role of the Interpreter

The three main approaches to the metaphysics of intentionality can arguably be subjected to analysis in terms of grammatical point of view: the approach of the (internalist) phenomenal intentionality programme (plus productivism about linguistic content) may be regarded as first-personal; interpretationism, perhaps, as second-personal; and (reductive externalist) causal information theories (including teleosemantics) as third-personal. After making this plausible, the current paper focusses on the role of the interpreter (if any) in interpretationism. It argues that, despite some considerations from the publicity of meaning potentially suggesting the contrary, radical interpretation is not subject to epistemic constraint; nor should the interpretationist appeal to the idiosyncratic interests of actual interpreters, thereby rendering the approach irremediably relativistic. Instead, an appeal to the pure form of interestedness is all that is involved; this supports a methodologically non-reductive outlook on intentionality