In The Inherent Irrationality of Judgment Proofing, Professor Steven L. Schwarcz raises interesting new arguments against my death of liability thesis. The sheer number of those arguments makes it impossible for me to respond to all of them. The core of Schwarcz\u27s insight is to divide judgment proofing structures into those negotiated at arm\u27s length and those constructed within a single corporate group. I consider his arguments regarding the first set of structures in Part I and the second set in Part II
The evolution of the understanding of evidence-based proof and decision processes in the law, especi...
The dominant theory of judgment in 1870 was one or other variety of combination theory: the act of j...
Based on systems/strategic analysis, this paper predicts the complete failure of legal liability sys...
In The Inherent Irrationality of Judgment Proofing, Professor Steven L. Schwarcz raises interesting ...
In recent articles in the Yale Law Journal and the Stanford Law Review, Professor Lynn M. LoPucki ha...
This is a rejoinder by the author of The Death of Liability, 106 Yale L.J. 1 (1996). The rejoinder i...
This article argues that substantially all judgment proofing can be described through a single model...
In The Death of Liability Professor Lynn M. LoPucki argues that American businesses are rendering ...
This study shows that the effects of judgment proofness on precaution depend on whether the injurer ...
Although the case for the judgment-dependence of many other domains has been pored over, surprisingl...
This study shows that the effects of judgment proofness on precaution depend on whether the injurer ...
The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent pleadings decisions—Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. ...
A tortfeasor who cannot fully pay for the harms that it causes is said to be judgment proof. Comme...
Particular reasoning is arguably the most common type of legal reasoning. Neil MacCormick proposed t...
Typically, expert judgments are regarded by laypeople as highly trustworthy. However, expert asserti...
The evolution of the understanding of evidence-based proof and decision processes in the law, especi...
The dominant theory of judgment in 1870 was one or other variety of combination theory: the act of j...
Based on systems/strategic analysis, this paper predicts the complete failure of legal liability sys...
In The Inherent Irrationality of Judgment Proofing, Professor Steven L. Schwarcz raises interesting ...
In recent articles in the Yale Law Journal and the Stanford Law Review, Professor Lynn M. LoPucki ha...
This is a rejoinder by the author of The Death of Liability, 106 Yale L.J. 1 (1996). The rejoinder i...
This article argues that substantially all judgment proofing can be described through a single model...
In The Death of Liability Professor Lynn M. LoPucki argues that American businesses are rendering ...
This study shows that the effects of judgment proofness on precaution depend on whether the injurer ...
Although the case for the judgment-dependence of many other domains has been pored over, surprisingl...
This study shows that the effects of judgment proofness on precaution depend on whether the injurer ...
The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent pleadings decisions—Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. ...
A tortfeasor who cannot fully pay for the harms that it causes is said to be judgment proof. Comme...
Particular reasoning is arguably the most common type of legal reasoning. Neil MacCormick proposed t...
Typically, expert judgments are regarded by laypeople as highly trustworthy. However, expert asserti...
The evolution of the understanding of evidence-based proof and decision processes in the law, especi...
The dominant theory of judgment in 1870 was one or other variety of combination theory: the act of j...
Based on systems/strategic analysis, this paper predicts the complete failure of legal liability sys...