The Shapley value assigns each game in Characteristic form a result (contribution) for each player. In games with externalities, there is a Partition Function assigned to the characteristic representation. Various generalisations or extensions of the Shapley value have been developed in the literature. The Shapley value for games in Partition Function Form can be interpreted as the ex ante value of a process of successive bilateral mergers. Game-theoretic formulations of feature importance are a way of explaining machine learning models. These methods define a cooperative game between features in a model and using Shapley’s value study the influence of input features. The externality modelled in the game is read as a further measure of the ...
The impressive amount of papers concerning the Shapley value, seems to well reflect the success of t...
Cooperative game theory aims to predict the formation of coalitions, analyze the joint actions taken...
In potential games, as considered by Monderer and Shapley (1996a, Games Econom. Behav. 14, 124-143),...
The Shapley value assigns each game in Characteristic form a result (contribution) for each player. ...
Game theory provides valuable tools to examine expert multi-agent systems. In a cooperative game, co...
Shapley value -- a useful way to allocate gains in cooperative games -- has been very successful in ...
For games in partition function form, we explore the implications of distinguishing between the conc...
Over the last few years, the Shapley value, a solution concept from cooperative game theory, has fou...
Different axiomatic systems for the Shapley value can be found in the literature.For games with a co...
This is an Accepted Manuscript of a book chapter published by Routledge/CRC Press in Handbook of the...
We provide new characterization results for the value of games in partition function form. In partic...
Game theory is the study of mathematical models of competition and cooperation between rational dec...
The Shapley value assigns, to each game that is adequately represented by its characteristic functio...
Until recently, computational aspects of the Shapley value were only studied under the assumption th...
We consider the issue of representing coalitional games in multi-agent systems that exhibit external...
The impressive amount of papers concerning the Shapley value, seems to well reflect the success of t...
Cooperative game theory aims to predict the formation of coalitions, analyze the joint actions taken...
In potential games, as considered by Monderer and Shapley (1996a, Games Econom. Behav. 14, 124-143),...
The Shapley value assigns each game in Characteristic form a result (contribution) for each player. ...
Game theory provides valuable tools to examine expert multi-agent systems. In a cooperative game, co...
Shapley value -- a useful way to allocate gains in cooperative games -- has been very successful in ...
For games in partition function form, we explore the implications of distinguishing between the conc...
Over the last few years, the Shapley value, a solution concept from cooperative game theory, has fou...
Different axiomatic systems for the Shapley value can be found in the literature.For games with a co...
This is an Accepted Manuscript of a book chapter published by Routledge/CRC Press in Handbook of the...
We provide new characterization results for the value of games in partition function form. In partic...
Game theory is the study of mathematical models of competition and cooperation between rational dec...
The Shapley value assigns, to each game that is adequately represented by its characteristic functio...
Until recently, computational aspects of the Shapley value were only studied under the assumption th...
We consider the issue of representing coalitional games in multi-agent systems that exhibit external...
The impressive amount of papers concerning the Shapley value, seems to well reflect the success of t...
Cooperative game theory aims to predict the formation of coalitions, analyze the joint actions taken...
In potential games, as considered by Monderer and Shapley (1996a, Games Econom. Behav. 14, 124-143),...