Implementing nuclear non-proliferation in Finland : Regulatory control, international cooperation and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty : Annual report 2021

Abstract The regulatory control of nuclear materials, nuclear safeguards, is a prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In order to maintain the Finnish part of the international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation – mainly the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – this regulatory control is implemented mainly by the Nuclear Materials Safeguards section of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). In addition, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment (MEAE) play a central role in the state system of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSAC). STUK cooperates nationally with the ministries, customs, border control and other domestic stakeholders in the areas of non-proliferation, export control and nuclear disarmament. Core stakeholders in the SSAC are the operators and licence holders who have the ultimate responsibility for their nuclear materials and related activities. Finland has quite significant nuclear power production, but the related nuclear industry is rather limited. Most of the declared nuclear materials (uranium, plutonium and thorium) in Finland reside at the nuclear power plants at Olkiluoto and Loviisa. In addition, there is a shutdown research reactor in Espoo with fresh nuclear fuel still at the site. Other Finnish operators include STUK itself, the University of Helsinki and VTT’s Centre for Nuclear Safety as mid-sized holders, holders of nuclear materials generated as concentrates or by-products in the mineral processing industry and 13 minor nuclear material holders. STUK maintains a national nuclear materials accountancy system and verifies that nuclear activities in Finland are carried out in accordance with the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act and Decree, European Union safeguards regulations, and international agreements. These tasks are performed to verify that Finland can assure itself and the international community of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities and materials. In addition to this, the IAEA evaluates the success of the state safeguards system, and the European Commission participates in safeguarding the materials under its jurisdiction. The results of STUK's nuclear safeguards accounting and verification activities in 2021 continued to demonstrate that Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities, and the inspected materials and activities were in accordance with the operators' declarations. The operators’ own nuclear materials accountancy and control systems enabled STUK to fulfil its own obligations under the international agreements relevant to nuclear safeguards. STUK and other stakeholders continued work in the difficult environment caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Experiences from and routine developed in the previous year allowed STUK to carry on with safeguards inspection activities uninterrupted. Travel restrictions kept impacting international events, including conferences and meetings. STUK cooperated with the operators with a shared objective of ensuring health and safety during inspections and other on-site activity. STUK finished the year with 41 inspections and 71 inspection days which are in line with the long-term averages. The number of international inspections and inspection days were also at a normal level. According to the statements on inspection results and the conclusion of safeguards implementation provided by the IAEA and the Commission in 2021, the IAEA required one action from a Finnish operator. The Nuclear Materials Safeguards section executed STUK’s strategic priorities of effective oversight and regulatory work by empowering the operators to better take responsibility for their own safeguards control. For example, the operators’ responsible officers are encouraged to further develop the operator’s own safeguards system and their nuclear material handbooks. In the section, new and old inspectors kept developing in their responsibility areas and expanding their knowledge in, for example, nuclear legislation. In the near future, such knowledge will gain even more importance, as the project to comprehensively update Finnish nuclear legislation is already under way. The development of the safeguards instrumentation for the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel maintained its position as the highlight of the technical development work in the Finnish nuclear safeguards system. In particular, this involves the passive gamma emission tomography and passive neutron albedo reactivity measurement methods. A major goal of all current Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)-related activities is the entry into force of the CTBT itself. An important prerequisite for such positive political action is that the verification system of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) is functioning and able to provide assurance to all parties that it is impossible to carry out a clandestine nuclear test without detection. The FiNDC is committed to its own role in this common endeavour, so that the verification system of the CTBTO can accomplish its detection task