Add to ORKGWe use two authentication primitives proposed recently as a linguistic support for enforcing authentication. They offer a way of abstracting from various specifications of authentication and of obtaining idealized protocols ''secure by construction''. Consequently, they help in proving that a cryptographic protocol correctly implements its corresponding abstract version; when the implementation is incorrect, suggestions on how to fix it may come from reasoning on the abstract specification
We consider machine-aided verification of suitably constructed abstractions of security protocols, ...
We present a new technique for verifying authenticity in cryptographic protocols. This technique is ...
This paper presents a novel approach for concisely abstracting authentication protocols and for subs...
We use two authentication primitives proposed recently as a linguistic support for enforcing authent...
We use two authentication primitives proposed recently as a linguistic support for enforcing auth...
We advocate here the use of two authentication primitives we recently propose in a calculus for dist...
Abstract We propose a way to abstract from various specifications of authentication and to obtain id...
We propose a way to abstract from various specifications of authentication and to obtain idealized pr...
We propose a class of protocol transformations, which can be used to (1) develop (families of) secur...
This paper presents a novel approach for concisely abstracting authentication protocols and for subs...
In this paper, we describe a simple logic. The logic uses the notion of channels that are generalisa...
In this thesis, we show how formal methods can be used for the cryptographically sound verification ...
We consider machine-aided verification of suitably constructed abstractions of security protocols, ...
We present a large class of security protocol abstractions with the aim of improving the scope and e...
We present a large class of security protocol abstractions with the aim of improving the scope and e...
We consider machine-aided verification of suitably constructed abstractions of security protocols, ...
We present a new technique for verifying authenticity in cryptographic protocols. This technique is ...
This paper presents a novel approach for concisely abstracting authentication protocols and for subs...
We use two authentication primitives proposed recently as a linguistic support for enforcing authent...
We use two authentication primitives proposed recently as a linguistic support for enforcing auth...
We advocate here the use of two authentication primitives we recently propose in a calculus for dist...
Abstract We propose a way to abstract from various specifications of authentication and to obtain id...
We propose a way to abstract from various specifications of authentication and to obtain idealized pr...
We propose a class of protocol transformations, which can be used to (1) develop (families of) secur...
This paper presents a novel approach for concisely abstracting authentication protocols and for subs...
In this paper, we describe a simple logic. The logic uses the notion of channels that are generalisa...
In this thesis, we show how formal methods can be used for the cryptographically sound verification ...
We consider machine-aided verification of suitably constructed abstractions of security protocols, ...
We present a large class of security protocol abstractions with the aim of improving the scope and e...
We present a large class of security protocol abstractions with the aim of improving the scope and e...
We consider machine-aided verification of suitably constructed abstractions of security protocols, ...
We present a new technique for verifying authenticity in cryptographic protocols. This technique is ...
This paper presents a novel approach for concisely abstracting authentication protocols and for subs...