Towards a model of metaphorical understanding

I elaborate and contrast propositional and imagistic components of the meaning associated with metaphors. Considering some examples, I argue for a spreading activation model for representing the propositional component of the meaning. Then, based on recent behavioral and brain-imaging studies, I elaborate on a sensorimotor account of imagery, and argue that imagistic meaning is not peculiar to metaphor, but can play a key role in so-called literal utterances as well. I then propose an image-creating mechanism, which works in the opposite direction to the abstraction mechanism, to model the comprehension of certain metaphors. This is followed by some brief comments on how to incorporate the notion of correctness within this model. Finally, I argue for a unified account of understanding so that the same process models literal as well as metaphor comprehension. I argue that it is not the process of understanding that separates the metaphorical from the literal, but the nature of the activation pattern that results from the process