The Value And Limitations Of The European Union’s Restrictive Measures/Sanction Regimes As A Foreign Policy Tool To Achieve Objectives

Màster en Diplomàcia i Organitzacions Internacionals, Centre d'Estudis Internacionals. Universitat de Barcelona. Curs: 2021-2022. Tutor: Jordi Quero.The shortcoming of the EU to create a military force entails it is reliant on its economic statecraft as a coercive tool to achieve foreign policy objectives. This dissertation investigates EU sanctions/ restrictive measures by evaluating the value and limitation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) autonomous EU sanction vertical regimes implemented against Syria (2011-2021) and Russia (2014-2022). Traditional theoretical literature has largely judged the effectiveness of sanction based on the ‘behavioural change criteria’, that sanctions are a success if the targeted nations comply. However, this zero-sum approach fails to account for the intricacies of modern sanction regimes which often do not lead to a definitive objective successful outcome but a dynamic spectrum of wanted and unwanted outcomes. Rather this dissertation utilises the framework of Francisco Giumelli that follows the four steps of placing the sanction regime within the broader policies implemented; characterising the sanctions as a tool for coercing, constraining or signalling; analysing the sanctions unwanted and wanted outcomes; and finally evaluating if the sanctions were the best policy option available and thus permits a more dynamic interpretation of the effectiveness of EU sanctions. The pertinent findings that emerged from the evaluation of Syria was the importance of feasible demands for the sanctioned regime to comply and that leverage should be to be maintained, particularly when other policy options are lacking. Meanwhile, the regime implemented against Russia demonstrated that sanctions effectiveness reduces over time and that the threat of sanctions needs to be credible to be effective. Ultimately, sanctions are a useful policy tool but their impact reduces after use, either because of adaptation or preparation. Once sanctions are used international actors prefer autarkic policies over compliance and prepare their economies for future potential conflicts. This has the broader impact of adding to international rivalries and potentially fragmenting the global economy