A folk theorem which holds for all repeated matching games is established. The folk theorem holds any time the stage game payoffs of any two players are not affinely equivalent. The result is independent of population size and matching rule-including rules that depend on players choices or the history of play. © 2007 Springer Verlag
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The folk theorem of repeated games has established that cooperative behavior can be sustained as an ...
This paper studies the possibility of whole population cooperation based on players' preferences. Co...
This entry shows why self-interested agents manage to cooperate in a long-term relationship. When ag...
This paper revisits a particular norm of behaviour underlying the well known model of kinked demand....
Duelling The norm of duelling endured for hundreds of years in Europe. In the United Kingdom it dis...
We study infinitely repeated anonymous random matching games played by communities of players, who o...
We examine a new class of games, which we call social games, where players not only choose strategie...
We prove the folk theorem for discounted repeated games with anonymous random matching. We allow non...
"Selection in Dynamic Games" 1. Assortative Matching with costly search, presented by Alp Atakan 2. ...
Some social scientists argue that the widespread of cooperation within societies is the fact that mo...
Abstract: We examine a new class of games, which we call social games, where players not only choose...
We study a particular case of repeated games with public signals. In the stage game an odd number of...
This study considers evolutionary games with non-uniformly random matching when interaction occurs i...
We consider a two-player game in which one player can take a costly action (i.e., to provide a favor...
The n-player public goods game, the basic model of decentralized social cooperation in non-market se...
The folk theorem of repeated games has established that cooperative behavior can be sustained as an ...
This paper studies the possibility of whole population cooperation based on players' preferences. Co...
This entry shows why self-interested agents manage to cooperate in a long-term relationship. When ag...
This paper revisits a particular norm of behaviour underlying the well known model of kinked demand....
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