The majority judgement is a method of election. It is the consequence of a new theory of social choice where voters judge candidates instead of ranking them. The theory is explained elsewhere [2, 4]. This article describes and analyzes electoral experiments conducted in parallel with the last two French presidential elections to: (1) show that the majority judgement is a practical method, (2) describe it and its salient properties, (3) establish that it escapes the classical paradoxes, (4) illustrate how in practice the well known electoral mechanisms all fail to meet important criteria. The demonstrations introduce new concepts and methods.Le jugement majoritaire est une méthode d'élection. Cette méthode est l'aboutissement d'une nouvelle ...
This paper presents the framed-field experiment on Approval Voting and (+2,+1,0) Evaluation Voting r...
Throughout the world, the choice of one from among a set of candidates is accomplished by elections....
We propose a theory of strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: A fixed n...
The majority judgement is a method of election. It is the consequence of a new theory of social choi...
This article explains why the traditional model of the theory of social choice misrepresents reality...
The traditional model of the theory of social choice admits a host of impossibility theorems and has...
This paper describes aspects of the majority judgment in an election. The majority judgment is a met...
Like many other voting systems, Majority Judgement suffers from the weaknesses of the underlying mat...
Impossibility theorems expose inconsistencies and paradoxes related to voting systems. Recently, Mic...
This paper reports an experiment realised with 850 electors during the 2017 French presidential elec...
The validity of majority rule in an election with but two candidates—and so also of Condorcet consis...
The validity of majority rule in an election with but two candidates—and of Condorcet consistency—is...
AbstractThe majority judgment (MJ) voting method works well in theory and in practice. Not only does...
In 2002 and 2007, during the French presidential elections, several experiments have taken place, de...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
This paper presents the framed-field experiment on Approval Voting and (+2,+1,0) Evaluation Voting r...
Throughout the world, the choice of one from among a set of candidates is accomplished by elections....
We propose a theory of strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: A fixed n...
The majority judgement is a method of election. It is the consequence of a new theory of social choi...
This article explains why the traditional model of the theory of social choice misrepresents reality...
The traditional model of the theory of social choice admits a host of impossibility theorems and has...
This paper describes aspects of the majority judgment in an election. The majority judgment is a met...
Like many other voting systems, Majority Judgement suffers from the weaknesses of the underlying mat...
Impossibility theorems expose inconsistencies and paradoxes related to voting systems. Recently, Mic...
This paper reports an experiment realised with 850 electors during the 2017 French presidential elec...
The validity of majority rule in an election with but two candidates—and so also of Condorcet consis...
The validity of majority rule in an election with but two candidates—and of Condorcet consistency—is...
AbstractThe majority judgment (MJ) voting method works well in theory and in practice. Not only does...
In 2002 and 2007, during the French presidential elections, several experiments have taken place, de...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
This paper presents the framed-field experiment on Approval Voting and (+2,+1,0) Evaluation Voting r...
Throughout the world, the choice of one from among a set of candidates is accomplished by elections....
We propose a theory of strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: A fixed n...