We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked preferences we find that One-round voting and Two-round voting generate significant path dependent effects, whereas Approval voting elects the Condorcet winner and Single Transferable vote (Hare system) does not. From the analysis of individual data we conclude that voters behave strategically as far as strategic computations are not too involved, in which case they rely on simple heuristics.Nous rendons compte d'une série d'expériences de laboratoire à propos des comportements de vote. Dans une situation où les sujets ont des préférences unimodales nous observons que le vote à un tour et le vote à deux tours génèrent des effets significatifs de dé...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting wheresubjects have single-peaked prefere...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting wheresubjects have single-peaked prefere...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting wheresubjects have single-peaked prefere...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting wheresubjects have single-peaked prefere...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked prefer...
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting wheresubjects have single-peaked prefere...