This article explains why the traditional model of the theory of social choice misrepresents reality, it cannot lead to acceptable methods of ranking and electing in any case, and a more realistic model leads inevitably to one method of ranking and electing—majority judgment—that best meets the traditional criteria of what constitutes a good method.Cet article explique pourquoi le modèle traditionnel de choix social n'est pas réaliste, il ne peut en aucun cas proposer une méthode acceptable pour classer et élire, et qu'un modèle plus réaliste implique inévitablement une seule méthode pour classer et élire ---le jugement majoritaire--- qui satisfait le mieux qu'il se peut les critères traditionnels de ce qui constitue une bonne méthode
The goal of this paper is to show that neither mean-based voting systems nor median-based ones can f...
Like many other voting systems, Majority Judgement suffers from the weaknesses of the underlying mat...
International audienceA Condorcet social choice procedure elects the candidate that beats every othe...
This article explains why the traditional model of the theory of social choice misrepresents reality...
This article argues that the traditional model of the theory of social choice is not a good model an...
The traditional model of the theory of social choice admits a host of impossibility theorems and has...
The majority judgement is a method of election. It is the consequence of a new theory of social choi...
International audienceIn Majority Judgment, Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki argue that the tradition...
Condcrcet ' s criterion states that an alternative that defeats every other by a simple majorit...
Impossibility theorems expose inconsistencies and paradoxes related to voting systems. Recently, Mic...
The paper elaborates the idea that voting is an instance of the aggregation of judgments, this being...
This paper describes aspects of the majority judgment in an election. The majority judgment is a met...
This paper presents computer simulations of voting rules: Plurality rule, Approval voting and the Co...
The theory of voting has largely developed independently of the mechanism design research, but...
This paper reports on a vote for choosing the best voting rules that was organized among the partici...
The goal of this paper is to show that neither mean-based voting systems nor median-based ones can f...
Like many other voting systems, Majority Judgement suffers from the weaknesses of the underlying mat...
International audienceA Condorcet social choice procedure elects the candidate that beats every othe...
This article explains why the traditional model of the theory of social choice misrepresents reality...
This article argues that the traditional model of the theory of social choice is not a good model an...
The traditional model of the theory of social choice admits a host of impossibility theorems and has...
The majority judgement is a method of election. It is the consequence of a new theory of social choi...
International audienceIn Majority Judgment, Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki argue that the tradition...
Condcrcet ' s criterion states that an alternative that defeats every other by a simple majorit...
Impossibility theorems expose inconsistencies and paradoxes related to voting systems. Recently, Mic...
The paper elaborates the idea that voting is an instance of the aggregation of judgments, this being...
This paper describes aspects of the majority judgment in an election. The majority judgment is a met...
This paper presents computer simulations of voting rules: Plurality rule, Approval voting and the Co...
The theory of voting has largely developed independently of the mechanism design research, but...
This paper reports on a vote for choosing the best voting rules that was organized among the partici...
The goal of this paper is to show that neither mean-based voting systems nor median-based ones can f...
Like many other voting systems, Majority Judgement suffers from the weaknesses of the underlying mat...
International audienceA Condorcet social choice procedure elects the candidate that beats every othe...