Cahier de Recherche du Groupe HEC Paris, n° 773We address the question of existence of equilibrium in general timing games of complete information. Under weak assumptions, any two-player timing game has a subgame perfect e-equilibrium, for each e > 0. This result is tight. For some classes of games (symmetric games, games with cumulative payoffs), stronger existence results are established
We prove the existence of a subgame-perfect e-equilibrium, for every e > 0, in a class of multi-p...
We study perfect information games played by an infinite sequence of players, each acting only once ...
We show that every bounded, continuous at infinity game of perfect information has an ε−perfect equi...
Cahier de Recherche du Groupe HEC Paris, n° 773We address the question of existence of equilibrium i...
We address the question of existence of equilibrium in general timing games with complete informatio...
1 We address the question of existence of equilibrium in general timing games of complete informatio...
Abstract: We develop a notion of subgames and the related notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium – po...
Steg J-H. On identifying subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes for timing games. Games and Economic B...
Riedel F, Steg J-H. Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Stochastic Timing Games. Center for Mathematical E...
We study multiplayer turn-based timed games with reachability objectives. In particular, we are inte...
We study games with almost perfect information and an infinite time horizon. In such games, at each ...
We present two simple proofs of existence of subgame perfect equilibria in continuous games with per...
We prove the existence of a subgame-perfect e-equilibrium, for every e > 0, in a class of multi-p...
We study perfect information games played by an infinite sequence of players, each acting only once ...
We show that every bounded, continuous at infinity game of perfect information has an ε−perfect equi...
Cahier de Recherche du Groupe HEC Paris, n° 773We address the question of existence of equilibrium i...
We address the question of existence of equilibrium in general timing games with complete informatio...
1 We address the question of existence of equilibrium in general timing games of complete informatio...
Abstract: We develop a notion of subgames and the related notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium – po...
Steg J-H. On identifying subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes for timing games. Games and Economic B...
Riedel F, Steg J-H. Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Stochastic Timing Games. Center for Mathematical E...
We study multiplayer turn-based timed games with reachability objectives. In particular, we are inte...
We study games with almost perfect information and an infinite time horizon. In such games, at each ...
We present two simple proofs of existence of subgame perfect equilibria in continuous games with per...
We prove the existence of a subgame-perfect e-equilibrium, for every e > 0, in a class of multi-p...
We study perfect information games played by an infinite sequence of players, each acting only once ...
We show that every bounded, continuous at infinity game of perfect information has an ε−perfect equi...