Typage, compilation, et cryptographie pour la programmation repartie securisée

We are more and more dependent on our computing infrastructure, and yet its security is challenged every day. From a research viewpoint, a lot of progress in security has been made, using in particular formal methods and programming language techniques. This has lead us to a first few small, exemplary verified systems and protocols. In spite of these results, it is still hard to gain strong confidence that a program is correct and secure, and most of the software that we depend upon offers very few guarantees. In this thesis, we focus on language-based security by construction. We take as input the specification of a distributed computation involving multiple participants, together with its expected security properties. We then verify that this specification is sound, using static verification techniques such as type systems, and we then automatically generate a program for each participant. During this compilation process, we select adequate cryptographic and hardware mechanisms, such that the compiled programs correctly implement the computation with the required security properties.Mes travaux s'articulent principalement autour de trois axes concernant la programmation sécurisée, plus particulièrement dans le cadre d'applications distribuées. Ainsi, nous considérons plusieurs participants ne se faisant pas mutuellement confiance et ayant des niveaux de sécurité différents. On s'intéresse alors au garanties restantes lorsque certains de ces participants sont compromis. Par exemple, lors d'une opération de commerce électronique, le client, le serveur, et la banque ne se font pas mutuellement confiance et font encore moins confiance aux machines intermédiaires du réseau; on veut pourtant qu'une transaction sécurisée puisse avoir lieu