Pragmatism and Metaphysics : Examining the thoughts of William James and Ferdinand C. S. Schiller

Pragmatism approves metaphysics as far as its views make difference to our behavior. This opinion is common to William James and Ferdinand C.S. Schiller both of whom were the representative pragmatists. The opinion is opposed to the logical positivism which rests on sensorial evidence and excludes the region without such evidence. When we observe the pure region of experience, we find out that this region does not contradict plural different metaphysical cosmologies. Thus, different metaphysical views come about such as materialism and idealism, determinism and free will, one and many, and so on. And as for pragmatism, for example, we can adopt two different types of views about our conscious experience: our brains produce it on one hand, and the other view is that brains only transform something into our experience. In this way, James insisted that empiricism and a pluralistic universe should be logically consistent. Then, what creates such metaphysical oppositions? Schiller attempted to identify the cause of them, and considered that metaphysical oppositions are created when we apply fundamental realities which are restricted and appropriate only to our utility to the whole universe which is outside of our utility. He regarded those fundamental realities themselves to be in the process of "Becoming", and the oppositions would disappear in that process. James also regarded such fundamental realities as the results of abstractions. True reality is, on the contrary, "the other of its own" and essentially cannot be captured in concept. However, since we regard only the former reality as rational, plural opposed metaphysical views are able to be brought about. James insisted that such opposition should disappear when we return to the dimension before rationality. Schiller held the same opinion with James in that he regarded the fundamental realities as restricted, but differed from James in that Schiller regarded those realities as the process of rational "Becoming" and that the whole of that process was in a monistic rational evolution