On Motivational Force in John Locke's Philosophy : Happiness, Desire, and Uneasiness

There is an interpretational controversy over John Locke's analysis of our decision-making process. Some argue that his position is naturalistic and compatibilistic. According to their interpretation, it is only desire that has a causal effect which is sufficient to decide human will. Others insist that his argument is non-naturalistic and libertarian. They say that there is good evidence for some kind of agent causation in Locke's thought. Both interpretations have their own merits, and the dispute is currently at an impasse. In this paper, I consider Locke's analysis of decision-making in terms of the question "what doesn't have motivational force?". Through this consideration I hope to resolve the impasse by indicating a new starting point for the dialectic. To do that, I review and criticize T. Magri's paper 'LOCKE, SUSPENSION OF DESIRE, AND THE REMOTE GOOD'. His paper is one of the most important articles on Locke's decision-making theory and the free-will problem, and is unique on the point that he examines Locke's theory in the light of the issue of motivational force. By criticizing his paper, I make it clear that no psychological entities -- such as an idea of good, desire in general, uneasiness, and desire for happiness -- can have motivational force by themselves. This shows that compatibilistic interpretations have a big problem in their starting presumption, and that they have to reconsider their claim that desire is able to decide the will by its own motivational force. In the process of arguing for this, I also give an elaboration of the nature of the concepts of happiness, desire, and uneasiness. These concepts are typically either completely misunderstood or just ignored. I suggest that reconsideration of these concepts is the first step to solving the interpretational dispute