From Body to Soul : Theory of Sense Perception and the Mind-Body Problem in Plato's Timaeus

In Timaeus 42e-47e and 61c-69a, Plato describes the mechanism of sense perception in detail. Luc Brisson analyzes these passages and concludes that Plato's explanation of sense perception fails because his theory does not explain how sensations have a connection with the soul or the mind. His criticism is based on the generally accepted doctrine that Plato espouses naïve psycho-physical dualism in which how a physical substance makes contact with a wholly non-physical substance cannot be explained. D. R. Miller opposes Brisson's position and tries to defend Plato's theory. He maintains that Plato never states the soul is in every respect immaterial. He points out that the World Soul is described as an intermediate kind of thing in Timaeus 35a1-4 : "In between the indivisible substance (ούσίας) which is always the same and the divisible that comes to be with respect to bodies, he compounded from both a third kind of substance." This paper criticizes both interpretations by examining the most important and controversial passages in question. In my view, Plutarch's elaborate interpretation of these passages (On the Generation of the Soul in the Timaeus) still has instructive value. He identifies the divisible substance with the χώρα (Receptacle), i.e., the omni-recipient nature, nurse of the things that are subjected to generation (1014CD). His suggestion on this point sheds light on the nature of the soul; it is possible not only to avoid the incorrect assimilation of the soul into matter, but also to discard the metaphorical interpretation of these passages as uninformative. For Plato, the soul is not a kind of Cartesian mind, but self-motion. The soul as nature can have continuous character (extensa) and pervade in the χώρα, which is neither an empty space nor material. It is the function of χώρα to intermediate between physical objects and the non-physical soul. Aristotle's criticism of Plato and his idea of soul bears a heavy responsibility for causing the misunderstanding of Plato's concept of the soul. Aristotle is the first critic to regard Timaeus 35a1-4 as showing that Plato's soul is made from material elements (De anima 404b16-18). Furthermore, he takes χώρα as ϋλη (material) because it has διάστημα (dimensionality), which is the essential factor for matter (Physica 209b et sq.) and deprives χώρα of its indispensable function as the intermediate between physical objects and the soul. This paper concludes that Plato can reasonably claim that the immaterial soul can make contact with the material body : Plato is not a so-called naïve MindBody dualist