From the Origin of Morality to the Evolutionary Ethics, part I : Reductionism in the Descriptive Ethics

Darwin's account for the origin of morality in The Descent of Man is still valuable; because he has provided a key concept for sound reductionism, or the "dangerous idea" as Daniel Dennett puts it. I will reconstruct Darwin's argument in response to J. G. Shurman's criticisms in The Ethical Import of Darwinism (1887). Shurman's most cogent criticism is that Darwin presents a mere imaginary psychology instead of an evolutionary account for the morality; and that Darwin's argument seems plausible because he assumed our moral experience when he tries to explain the genesis of moral feelings in a non-moral but intelligent animal. However, it is perfectly possible to interpret Darwin's "imaginary psychology" in terms of contemporary evolutionary theory; and I will show this in terms of the behavioral strategies of "ticks-picker" borrowed from Dawkins. This bird is supposed to be social and intelligent; and with this supposition, it is possible that a "conditionally altruistic" strategy prevails among its members, according to natural selection. Moreover, it is quite natural to suppose that such a strategy is supported by psychological make-up, which is exactly what Darwin tried to show. Thus "moral feelings" can evolve together with "altruistic" strategies; thus Darwin's reductionism with respect to morality can be maintained. This theoretical reconstruction can be supported by such recent results in primatology as de Waal's observations. Further, we can see that recent development of evolutionary psychology is still within the scope of Darwin's original idea