Hume's ‘Sympathy’-Ethics

David Hume tried to establish his theory of morals, which is contrary to the rationalistic ethical theory, on an emotional principle in human nature. According to this eminent successor of 'moral sense' school, the chief source of moral approbation is derived from 'the extensive sympathy with mankind', which is a particular kind of feeling because of its, though weak in degrees, yet general and constant agreeableness. By this extensive sympathy we can acquire an impartial standpoint of 'judicious spectator'. But the moral judgement based on this particular feeling is not always said to have the positive power to produce men's unselfish actions. In order to satisfy Hume's own postulation that morals, instead of mere speculation, should have a strong influence on our actions, he must confine the application of his sympathy-ethics only to a certain limited situation, that is, to a society founded on the 'convention', which somehow expresses basic interests common to all people. This confinement is one of the weak points in Hume's moral theory, which I think reflects the social situation in which he lived. Today we live in so violently conflicting human-relations as Hume never experienced, and so, in order to act morally in Hume's sense of the word, it is extremely important for us to endeavour to establish such a convention