Some Problems Concerning the Doctrines of Dignaga

So far no systematic study has ever been published on Dignāga's 'Pramāṇa-samuccaya' (Accumulation of the Means of Right Knowledge). His doctrines, however, as displayed in this work, are of no little importance for the study of the history of Indian Philosophy, especially of the Buddhist School of Idealism (vijñāna-vādin); for his theory of Logic stated therein not only made the epoch of the so-called ‘New Logic’ with regard to the logical technique, but it also had to do with the doctrinal aspect of Buddhism, in so far as it intended to provide the vijñāna-vādin with logical grounds. Thus, concerning Dignāga's doctrines, problems are raised in this article (1) on his doctrine about the source of Right Knowledge (pramāṇa-vāda), and (2) on some characteristics of his Idealism (vijñāna-vāda); and these are correspondingly tried to answer on the strength of his texts including the above-mentioned. (1) He outgrew the traditional Indian Logic which had principally consisted in teaching the method of controversies and proofs, by expounding a logic of an epistemic character, which, by way of logical explanations of Buddha's Enlightenment itself, was to offer a sounder foundation for the Buddhistic view of the world and of life. The “Pramāṇa-samuccaya” conspicuously starts with the express statement that Buddha is the incarnation of Right Knowledge (pramāṇa). (2) Here two questions are suggested : a) What does he think about the ‘storehouse of consciousness’? b) Does he really hold the ‘theory of the three aspects of cognitions’? a) Buddhist Idealists in general mention eight ‘cognitions’ in series; and, according to them, the whole world depends for its reality ultimately upon the last of the eight, i.e., the ‘storehouse of consciousness’ (ālaya-vijñāna). But we are inclined to believe that Dignāga left out the ālaya-vijñāna, as this would be nothing but the soul emerging in disguise, thus threatening to imperil the consequency of Buddhistic self-negation. His doctrine should rather be classed with the ‘six cognitions theory’. b) As for the ‘theory of the three aspects (bhāga) of cognitions’, Dignāga has usually been assumed by Buddhist Idealists to have insisted on the object (grāhya)-aspect, the subject (grāhaka)-aspect and the self-consciousness (sva-samvid)-aspect found in ideation (vijñāna) as being all relatively real (paratantra). The examination, however, of his works at large leads us to believe that he had no such intention but that he understood the first two aspects to be absolutely fanciful (parikalpita) and only the last relatively real, thus showing a close resemblance to the ‘one aspect theory’ stated by Sthiramati