An Analysis of the May Thirty Movement in Tianjin in 1925 : From the Viewpoint of International Politics and Economy

The purpose of this article is to analyze why the May Thirty Movement in the 1920s stagnated in North China, the main cause of which is generally attributed to either oppression by the military clique or the “backwardness” of society in North China. Instead of such simple interpretations, I have tried to depict a more specific regional context focusing on the case of Tianjin, which was related to international political and economic factors. After overviewing the mobilization process by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Kuomintang (KMT) of the people of Tianjin, I point out firstly that the conflict between the Fengtain clique and USSR for the Zhongdong Railway also had a large influence on the result of the CCP and KMT's mobilization. As the official history of CCP puts it, the military oppression of Li Jinglin, one of the generals of the Fengtitan clique, who took control over Tianjin in 1925, undoubtedly was the most direct cause that led to the failure of the May Thirty Movement in Tianjin. However, we should also focus on the fact that “labor movements” with which the USSR was involved were considered by Fengtain generals as a part of the invisible war for the Zhongdong Railway. Secondly, I show that the attitude of Tianjin merchants reflected economic factors. The Tianjin Chamber of Commerce (Tianjin Zongshanghui) and the Tianjin Merchants Representatives (Tianjin Tuanti Daibiaohui) would not give support to the strike and boycott planned by the CCP and students. It is interesting, however, that the Tianjin Merchants Representatives was regarded as an “anti-Japan” group by the Japanese until that time. I found that the serious economic damage in 1924 caused by heavy rains and floods from July onward, as well as the ravages of the Second Zhili-Fengtian War after September of the same year, made them indifferent to the movement. Additionally, the Tianjin Merchants Representatives had become inclined to cooperate economically with Japan after their visit to Japan in early 1924, which seems to have been prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. In conclusion, I suggest that the historical meaning of the stagnation of the May Thirty Movement in Tianjin is a contradiction between two dynamisms in modern China : one is the dynamism of “revolution, ” based on a network of secret societies in South China, and the other of “modernization, ” based on police system in North China. Given facts presented in this paper, it seems that in 1925 the former predominated over the latter