Testimonial Credibility Excess (and Deficit), from the perspective of a Character-Based Approach

Abstract In this philosophical essay Fricker’s stipulation that the primary characterization of testimonial injustice is a matter of credibility deficit and not credibility excess, will be called into question from the perspective of a view I have named the character- based approach (CBA). In the debate I will draw heavily on Medina´s proportional view of epistemic injustice. Fricker’s view that testimonial injustice centrally implicate (social) identity-prejudicial credibility deficit and Fricker’s phenomenon of epistemic bad luck will be challenged by CBA. The main question in this essay is: Should credibility excess be regarded equally as relevant of a component as credibility deficit is in unjust testimonial credibility assessments? I shall argue that credibility excess should be regarded as, at least, an equally relevant component. CBA will show the relevance of a more individually focussed approach to testimonial credibility assessments. The inquiry will show two ways where credibility excess is considered relevant within testimonial injustice (1) by the relevant link between credibility excess and credibility deficit and (2) by the (at least) equally relevancy of credibility excess, from the perspective of CBA. Key words: Testimony, Social Epistemology, Credibility Assessmen