Add to ORKGAccessible sur Bepress: http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/topics/vol5/iss1/art12International audienceIn a model of nonpoint source pollution, we extend the theory of ambient taxes to the case when polluters might cooperate. We show that regulation through ambient taxes is severely constrained when the degree of cooperation among polluters is unknown to the regulator. On the other hand, if the regulator can invest in costly monitoring of emissions, then the optimal regulation offers a low ambient tax to cooperative groups and an optimal but costly individual emission tax to non-cooperative groups. This mechanism also has attractive properties when risk-aversion is introduced
International audienceIn nonpoint source pollution problems, the regulator does not observe each pol...
In this article we treat the problem of nonpoint source pollution as a problem of moral hazard in gr...
In this article we treat the problem of nonpoint source pollution as a problem of moral hazard in gr...
Accessible sur Bepress: http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/topics/vol5/iss1/art12International audienceIn...
International audienceIn a model of nonpoint source pollution, we extend the theory of ambient taxes...
This article presents experimental tests of a linear and a nonlinear ambient tax mechanism that invo...
When a nonpoint source pollution process involves many polluters, each taking his own contribution t...
This paper offers a new mechanism in order to Nash-implement a Pareto optimal level of ambient pollu...
International audienceRegulation of non-point emission problems such as pesticide and nitrogen pollu...
L’objectif du travail de thèse a été de tester en laboratoire l’efficacité de deux variantes de taxe...
If a regulator is unable to measure firms' individual emissions, an ambient tax can be used to achie...
If a regulator is unable to measure firms' individual emissions, an ambient tax can be used to achie...
International audienceIn nonpoint source pollution problems, the regulator does not observe each pol...
We provide a stress experimental test of the ability of (a damaged based version) the ambient tax me...
International audienceIn nonpoint source pollution problems, the regulator does not observe each pol...
In this article we treat the problem of nonpoint source pollution as a problem of moral hazard in gr...
In this article we treat the problem of nonpoint source pollution as a problem of moral hazard in gr...
Accessible sur Bepress: http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/topics/vol5/iss1/art12International audienceIn...
International audienceIn a model of nonpoint source pollution, we extend the theory of ambient taxes...
This article presents experimental tests of a linear and a nonlinear ambient tax mechanism that invo...
When a nonpoint source pollution process involves many polluters, each taking his own contribution t...
This paper offers a new mechanism in order to Nash-implement a Pareto optimal level of ambient pollu...
International audienceRegulation of non-point emission problems such as pesticide and nitrogen pollu...
L’objectif du travail de thèse a été de tester en laboratoire l’efficacité de deux variantes de taxe...
If a regulator is unable to measure firms' individual emissions, an ambient tax can be used to achie...
If a regulator is unable to measure firms' individual emissions, an ambient tax can be used to achie...
International audienceIn nonpoint source pollution problems, the regulator does not observe each pol...
We provide a stress experimental test of the ability of (a damaged based version) the ambient tax me...
International audienceIn nonpoint source pollution problems, the regulator does not observe each pol...
In this article we treat the problem of nonpoint source pollution as a problem of moral hazard in gr...
In this article we treat the problem of nonpoint source pollution as a problem of moral hazard in gr...
