Sur quelques propriétés stratégiques de l'intéressement des salariés dans l'industrie

National audienceWe examine the properties of profit-sharing in an oligopoly model of industry. Profit-sharing contracts are viewed as a means of stratégie commltment, not as an internai incentive system. In our model, firms choose a contract subject to thé employées' participation constraint in a first stage, and compete on thé output market in a second stage. We show that thé choice of a profit-sharing contract by each firm is a non-coopérative equilibrium. The contract renegotlatlon issue is then discussed, and it is shown that thé adoption of profit-related pay in a given « incumbent » firm can deter entry on thé output market, in spite of thé fact that profit-sharing contracts are renegotiated, and that players hâve complète Information