JEL classification codes: D82 International audienceIt has been shown by Maskin and Tirole (1990, proposition 11) that with quasi-linear preferences and private values, an informed principal neither gains nor loses if her private information is revealed before contracting takes place. The note shows that this result may not hold when the agent faces countervailing incentives
This paper reconsiders the general informed principal model with unilateral private information and ...
This paper studies an otherwise standard principal-agent problem with hidden information, but whethe...
In this paper we propose a simple method of characterizing countervailing incentives in adverse sele...
JEL classification codes: D82 International audienceIt has been shown by Maskin and Tirole (1990, pr...
We show that, in environments with independent private values and transferable utility, a privately...
We show that, in environments with independent private values and transferable utility, a privately...
Three models of a privately informed contract designer (a principal) are examined. In the first, I s...
We consider a principal who deals with a privately informed agent protected by limited liability in...
Session ID 59: Principal-Agent ModelsA sender who wants to influence a decision maker has no incenti...
We study a model of informed principal with private values where the principal is risk neutral and t...
We consider a principal who signs a centralized grand-contract with two risk-neutral and limitedly l...
A principal hires an agent to acquire soft information about an unknown state. Even though neither h...
We study the informed-principal problem in a bilateral asymmetric information trading setting with ...
I show that cutting the flow of information between a principal and an agent can increase the power ...
Journal ArticleThis is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in the Journ...
This paper reconsiders the general informed principal model with unilateral private information and ...
This paper studies an otherwise standard principal-agent problem with hidden information, but whethe...
In this paper we propose a simple method of characterizing countervailing incentives in adverse sele...
JEL classification codes: D82 International audienceIt has been shown by Maskin and Tirole (1990, pr...
We show that, in environments with independent private values and transferable utility, a privately...
We show that, in environments with independent private values and transferable utility, a privately...
Three models of a privately informed contract designer (a principal) are examined. In the first, I s...
We consider a principal who deals with a privately informed agent protected by limited liability in...
Session ID 59: Principal-Agent ModelsA sender who wants to influence a decision maker has no incenti...
We study a model of informed principal with private values where the principal is risk neutral and t...
We consider a principal who signs a centralized grand-contract with two risk-neutral and limitedly l...
A principal hires an agent to acquire soft information about an unknown state. Even though neither h...
We study the informed-principal problem in a bilateral asymmetric information trading setting with ...
I show that cutting the flow of information between a principal and an agent can increase the power ...
Journal ArticleThis is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in the Journ...
This paper reconsiders the general informed principal model with unilateral private information and ...
This paper studies an otherwise standard principal-agent problem with hidden information, but whethe...
In this paper we propose a simple method of characterizing countervailing incentives in adverse sele...
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