The Bonacich centrality is a well-known measure of the relative importance of nodes in a network. This notion is, for example, at the core of Google’s Page Rank algorithm. In this paper we study a network formation game where each player corresponds to a node in the network to be formed. The action of a player consists in the assignment of m out-links and his utility is his own Bonacich centrality. We study the Nash equilibria (NE) and the best response dynamics of this game. In particular, we provide a complete classification of the set of NE when m = 1 and a fairly complete classification of the NE when m = 2. Our analysis shows that the centrality maximization performed by each node tends to create undirected and disconnected or loosely ...
We study linear quadratic games played on a network. Agents face peer effects with distance-one neig...
We study linear quadratic games played on a network. Agents face peer effects with distance-one neig...
We investigate a class of network games with strategic complements and bounded strategy sets by usin...
We combine a network game introduced in Ballester et al. (2006), where the Nash equilibrium action o...
AbstractIn computer networks and social networks, the betweenness centrality of a node measures the ...
We model the formation of networks as a game where players aspire to maximize their own centrality b...
Payoff division schemes from cooperative game theory, such as the Shapley value and Banzhaf index, h...
Abstract—We model the formation of networks as a game where players aspire to maximize their own cen...
Some game-theoretic solution concepts such as the Shapley value and the Banzhaf index have recently ...
Solution concepts from cooperative game theory, such as the Shapley value or the Banzhaf index, have...
We consider a stylized model of content contribution in a peer-to-peer network. The model is appeali...
We consider a stylized model of content contribution in a peer-to-peer network. The model is appeali...
Over the last few years, the problem of determining the most important nodes in a graph has gained a...
Game-theoretic solution concepts—most notably the Shapley value, arguably, the most important normat...
We study linear quadratic games played on a network. Agents face peer effects with distance-one neig...
We study linear quadratic games played on a network. Agents face peer effects with distance-one neig...
We study linear quadratic games played on a network. Agents face peer effects with distance-one neig...
We investigate a class of network games with strategic complements and bounded strategy sets by usin...
We combine a network game introduced in Ballester et al. (2006), where the Nash equilibrium action o...
AbstractIn computer networks and social networks, the betweenness centrality of a node measures the ...
We model the formation of networks as a game where players aspire to maximize their own centrality b...
Payoff division schemes from cooperative game theory, such as the Shapley value and Banzhaf index, h...
Abstract—We model the formation of networks as a game where players aspire to maximize their own cen...
Some game-theoretic solution concepts such as the Shapley value and the Banzhaf index have recently ...
Solution concepts from cooperative game theory, such as the Shapley value or the Banzhaf index, have...
We consider a stylized model of content contribution in a peer-to-peer network. The model is appeali...
We consider a stylized model of content contribution in a peer-to-peer network. The model is appeali...
Over the last few years, the problem of determining the most important nodes in a graph has gained a...
Game-theoretic solution concepts—most notably the Shapley value, arguably, the most important normat...
We study linear quadratic games played on a network. Agents face peer effects with distance-one neig...
We study linear quadratic games played on a network. Agents face peer effects with distance-one neig...
We study linear quadratic games played on a network. Agents face peer effects with distance-one neig...
We investigate a class of network games with strategic complements and bounded strategy sets by usin...