We characterise properties of optimal auctions if the seller may disclose information about the quality of the object for sale. We show that the seller maximizes his expected revenue by revelation of all information to all bidders and implementing a second price auction with appropriate reservation price. © Springer-Verlag 2009
We analyze how voluntary disclosure of information by bidders affects the outcome of optimally desig...
We analyze how voluntary disclosure of information by bidders affects the outcome of optimally desig...
This paper analyzes a situation in which the seller controls the accuracy of what potential buyers l...
We characterise properties of optimal auctions if the seller may disclose information about the qual...
We characterize the revenue-maximizing information structure in the second price auction. The seller...
We characterize the revenue-maximizing information structure in the second price auction. The seller...
A celebrated result in auction theory is that the optimal reserve price in the standard private val...
A celebrated result in auction theory is that the optimal reserve price in the standard private val...
We analyze the situation where a monopolist is selling an indivisible good to risk neutral buyers wh...
We analyze a situation where a monopolist is selling an indivisible good to risk neutral buyers who ...
[Preliminary, do not quote without permission from the authors] We study a situation in which a sell...
We analyze how voluntary disclosure of information by bidders affects the outcome of optimally desig...
We analyze how voluntary disclosure of information by bidders affects the outcome of optimally desig...
We analyze how voluntary disclosure of information by bidders affects the outcome of optimally desig...
We analyze how voluntary disclosure of information by bidders affects the outcome of optimally desig...
We analyze how voluntary disclosure of information by bidders affects the outcome of optimally desig...
We analyze how voluntary disclosure of information by bidders affects the outcome of optimally desig...
This paper analyzes a situation in which the seller controls the accuracy of what potential buyers l...
We characterise properties of optimal auctions if the seller may disclose information about the qual...
We characterize the revenue-maximizing information structure in the second price auction. The seller...
We characterize the revenue-maximizing information structure in the second price auction. The seller...
A celebrated result in auction theory is that the optimal reserve price in the standard private val...
A celebrated result in auction theory is that the optimal reserve price in the standard private val...
We analyze the situation where a monopolist is selling an indivisible good to risk neutral buyers wh...
We analyze a situation where a monopolist is selling an indivisible good to risk neutral buyers who ...
[Preliminary, do not quote without permission from the authors] We study a situation in which a sell...
We analyze how voluntary disclosure of information by bidders affects the outcome of optimally desig...
We analyze how voluntary disclosure of information by bidders affects the outcome of optimally desig...
We analyze how voluntary disclosure of information by bidders affects the outcome of optimally desig...
We analyze how voluntary disclosure of information by bidders affects the outcome of optimally desig...
We analyze how voluntary disclosure of information by bidders affects the outcome of optimally desig...
We analyze how voluntary disclosure of information by bidders affects the outcome of optimally desig...
This paper analyzes a situation in which the seller controls the accuracy of what potential buyers l...
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