We develop a bidimensional matching model under transferable utility, where individuals are characterized by a continuous trait (e.g., socioeconomic status) and a binary attribute (e.g., smoking status). The model is "truly multidimensional", in the sense that the impact of the traits cannot be summarized by a one-dimensional index. We present a general resolution strategy based on optimal control theory, and characterize the stable matching. We derive testable predictions about equilibrium matching patterns. Using US data, we find that the observed marital sorting of smokers and non-smokers by education is consistent with our model
Here we consider a matching model where agents are heterogeneous and util-ities nontransferable. We ...
This paper considers equilibrium two-sided search with ex ante heterogeneous agents, vectors of attr...
We describe a model of multi-trait matching and inheritance in which individuals’ attractiveness in ...
We develop a frictionless matching model under transferable utility where individuals are characteri...
We develop a frictionless matching model under transferable utility where individuals are characteri...
This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Oxford University Press ...
We develop a bidimensional frictionless matching model under transferable utility, where individuals...
We develop a matching model on the marriage market, where individuals have preferences over the smok...
This paper provides an assessment of the implementation of a canonical two-sided matching model usin...
This paper studies a marriage market with heterogeneous preferences. Individuals have incentive to a...
This paper provides closed-form formulas for a multidimensional two-sided matching problem with tran...
We construct a frictionless matching model of the marriage market where women have bidimensional att...
This dissertation studies equilibrium matching patterns in the marriage and labor markets when agent...
Many social processes studied by demographers can be viewed as two-sided matching markets. For examp...
The preferences of men and women are intercorrelated to the extent that men rank highly those women ...
Here we consider a matching model where agents are heterogeneous and util-ities nontransferable. We ...
This paper considers equilibrium two-sided search with ex ante heterogeneous agents, vectors of attr...
We describe a model of multi-trait matching and inheritance in which individuals’ attractiveness in ...
We develop a frictionless matching model under transferable utility where individuals are characteri...
We develop a frictionless matching model under transferable utility where individuals are characteri...
This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Oxford University Press ...
We develop a bidimensional frictionless matching model under transferable utility, where individuals...
We develop a matching model on the marriage market, where individuals have preferences over the smok...
This paper provides an assessment of the implementation of a canonical two-sided matching model usin...
This paper studies a marriage market with heterogeneous preferences. Individuals have incentive to a...
This paper provides closed-form formulas for a multidimensional two-sided matching problem with tran...
We construct a frictionless matching model of the marriage market where women have bidimensional att...
This dissertation studies equilibrium matching patterns in the marriage and labor markets when agent...
Many social processes studied by demographers can be viewed as two-sided matching markets. For examp...
The preferences of men and women are intercorrelated to the extent that men rank highly those women ...
Here we consider a matching model where agents are heterogeneous and util-ities nontransferable. We ...
This paper considers equilibrium two-sided search with ex ante heterogeneous agents, vectors of attr...
We describe a model of multi-trait matching and inheritance in which individuals’ attractiveness in ...