The selection drift against perfect rationality

A direct application of game theory to conflicts and cooperation of organisms gives different theoretical predictions for their behaviour than economic models, even if the economic models are based on game theory themselves. These direct predictions are in better accordance with empirical data than the economic models. A difference is observed even if we analyse how organisms deal with sources and how they compete for sources, a problem of apparently economic nature. My thesis shows that these contradictions cannot be removed in a plausible way, even not via introducing new biological restrictions in the "economic" decision model applied to organisms, and not even via enriching the utility functions by evolutionary goals. Thus it is not satisfactory to assume rational agents who replaced a utility maximisation by the maximisation of offspring numbers. In my model, gathering of sources is used in a game-theoretical analysis as a necessary condition, but not as a sufficient condition of evolutionary sustainability. Analýza predicts that the fact whether a rational, collectively rational, altruistic, or different strategy wins in some population, is a matter of random fluctuation. In this model, agents will, with non-neglectable probability, behave in a way that contradicts perfect rationality. This..