Add to ORKGIn this article, we provide a new basis for the kernel of the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953), which is used to construct a new axiom of invariance, and to provide a new axiomatic characterization of the Shapley value. This characterization only invokes marginalistic principles, and does not rely on classical axioms such as symmetry, efficiency or linearity. Moreover, our approach reveals a new instructive role played by veto players
In this paper we introduce discounting in the bidding mechanism of Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (J ...
The paper by S. Moretti and F. Patrone is a remarkable survey on the use of the Shapley value in man...
One of the main issues in economic allocation problems is the trade-off between marginalism and egal...
In this article, we provide a new basis for the kernel of the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953), which i...
We introduce a non linear weighted Shapley value for cooperative games with transferable utility, in...
We provide new axiomatic characterizations of the proportional Shapley value, a weighted TU-value w...
International audienceThe classical Shapley value is the average marginal contribution of a player, ...
Shapley (1953a) introduced the weighted Shapley values as a family of values, also known as Shapley ...
If a player boycotts another player, it means that the cooperation gains of all coalitions containin...
We characterize the Shapley value using (together with standard conditions of efficiency and equal g...
We give a new proof of Young's characterization of the Shapley value. Moreover, as applications of t...
We propose and characterize a new family of Shapley values for games with coalitional externalities....
The per capita Shapley support levels value extends the Shapley value to cooperative games with a le...
In this paper we introduce discounting in the bidding mechanism of Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (J ...
The paper by S. Moretti and F. Patrone is a remarkable survey on the use of the Shapley value in man...
One of the main issues in economic allocation problems is the trade-off between marginalism and egal...
In this article, we provide a new basis for the kernel of the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953), which i...
We introduce a non linear weighted Shapley value for cooperative games with transferable utility, in...
We provide new axiomatic characterizations of the proportional Shapley value, a weighted TU-value w...
International audienceThe classical Shapley value is the average marginal contribution of a player, ...
Shapley (1953a) introduced the weighted Shapley values as a family of values, also known as Shapley ...
If a player boycotts another player, it means that the cooperation gains of all coalitions containin...
We characterize the Shapley value using (together with standard conditions of efficiency and equal g...
We give a new proof of Young's characterization of the Shapley value. Moreover, as applications of t...
We propose and characterize a new family of Shapley values for games with coalitional externalities....
The per capita Shapley support levels value extends the Shapley value to cooperative games with a le...
In this paper we introduce discounting in the bidding mechanism of Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (J ...
The paper by S. Moretti and F. Patrone is a remarkable survey on the use of the Shapley value in man...
One of the main issues in economic allocation problems is the trade-off between marginalism and egal...