We are in basic agreement with Crump et al. that animal welfare, particularly with regard to the experience of pain, is a topic of importance. However, we come to the issue from a different perspective, one in which all species are sentient and can feel pain. The implications of this theory are discussed
It is high time to explore the sentience of invertebrate animals, but this topic cannot be discussed...
Although Key (2016) argues that mammals feel pain and fish do not, from an invertebrate perspective,...
Crump et al.’s contribution to assessing whether decapods feel pain raises an important question: Is...
We are in basic agreement with Crump et al. that animal welfare, particularly with regard to the exp...
Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) argue that it is wrong to dismiss the idea of sentience in invertebrates...
We outline a framework for evaluating scientific evidence of sentience, focusing on pain experience....
Crump et al.’s framework is a powerful tool designed to assist decisions on the ethical treatment of...
The eight criteria proposed in Crump et al.’s framework for evaluating pain sentience in decapod cru...
The aim of this commentary is to expand the discussion about subjective experience to other arthropo...
In 1985 Macphail proposed his Null Hypothesis that there were no qualitative differences in intellig...
Sentience is the capacity to have feelings, such as feelings of pain, pleasure, hunger, thirst, warm...
In the target article Crump et al. present 8 criteria to assess whether decapods experience pain. Fo...
Sentience is the capacity to have feelings, such as feelings of pain, pleasure, hunger, thirst, warm...
The framework proposed by Crump et al. still leaves much doubt about whether invertebrates such as c...
Summary. Whether invertebrates are able or not to experience pain is a highly controversial issue. a...
It is high time to explore the sentience of invertebrate animals, but this topic cannot be discussed...
Although Key (2016) argues that mammals feel pain and fish do not, from an invertebrate perspective,...
Crump et al.’s contribution to assessing whether decapods feel pain raises an important question: Is...
We are in basic agreement with Crump et al. that animal welfare, particularly with regard to the exp...
Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) argue that it is wrong to dismiss the idea of sentience in invertebrates...
We outline a framework for evaluating scientific evidence of sentience, focusing on pain experience....
Crump et al.’s framework is a powerful tool designed to assist decisions on the ethical treatment of...
The eight criteria proposed in Crump et al.’s framework for evaluating pain sentience in decapod cru...
The aim of this commentary is to expand the discussion about subjective experience to other arthropo...
In 1985 Macphail proposed his Null Hypothesis that there were no qualitative differences in intellig...
Sentience is the capacity to have feelings, such as feelings of pain, pleasure, hunger, thirst, warm...
In the target article Crump et al. present 8 criteria to assess whether decapods experience pain. Fo...
Sentience is the capacity to have feelings, such as feelings of pain, pleasure, hunger, thirst, warm...
The framework proposed by Crump et al. still leaves much doubt about whether invertebrates such as c...
Summary. Whether invertebrates are able or not to experience pain is a highly controversial issue. a...
It is high time to explore the sentience of invertebrate animals, but this topic cannot be discussed...
Although Key (2016) argues that mammals feel pain and fish do not, from an invertebrate perspective,...
Crump et al.’s contribution to assessing whether decapods feel pain raises an important question: Is...