Forcefully Nudging Democracy: Evaluating the Effect of the European Union's Leverage on Ukraine's Anti-Corruption Reforms

This paper strives to understand the role of the European Union (amongst other actors) in the creation of Ukrainian institutional rule of law and anti-corruption reform. By using the European Neighborhood Policy—specifically the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine and its related conditionality—as a starting point, this study analyzes the influence of the EU in Ukraine’s institutional anti- corruption reform efforts. Institutional reform, here, refers to the restructuring, refocusing, or creation of anti-corruption institutions and practices which bolster the quality of democracy (as benchmarked by impartial organizations such as Transparency International) and rule of law in Ukraine. Conditionality refers to the specific conditions that international actors tie to aid and rewards in order to influence the development of a country. This paper argues that the European Union, while influential, does not take into account its incapacities and weaknesses as an organization which prevent it from better impacting the countries in its sphere of influence. This paper utilizes quantitative and qualitative methods such as interviews, document analysis, and parliamentary vote analysis in order to paint a picture of the current state of affairs in Ukraine, the shortcomings and successes of European policy, and the role of domestic actors in facilitating or preventing effective reforms. The findings of this study show that, despite a clear European influence in Ukraine, the European Union’s “Neighborhood Policy”—through its Association Agreement with Ukraine—continues to ignore pre-existing incentive structures within the country, mitigating many of the gains made through conditionality. Furthermore, this paper demonstrates a diminishing relevance of the EU’s Association Agreement in both Ukrainian political and civil society. In understanding the influence of the European Union and how it interacts with domestic actors, nuances of Ukrainian society and shortcomings of the European external affairs model are illuminated. Successes of European conditionality are also showcased, demonstrating which aspects of European soft power are most effective in the context of democratization. Policy recommendations will focus on the implications of this soft power and the ways in which it can be better leveraged to promote democratic values in Ukraine