Adapting for Survival: Islamic State’s Shifting Strategies

This article discusses the strategic shifts that the Islamic State (IS) has implemented in orderto survive, especially in what regards its propaganda and military tactics. We argue that – fora long time now and in both domains – the IS and its predecessors have been flexible andresilient enough to adapt to new realities on the ground being able to shape and reshape itsstrategy and tactics towards its enemies’ capabilities and policies. In terms of propaganda,despite a decrease of its online presence, the IS has struggled to adapt some of its mainnarratives to the new reality brought about by the beginning of the international coalition attacks. However, evidence seems to suggest that the group will likely be able to maintainits online relevance yet for some time. Regarding its military tactics in Syria and Iraq, historyand current evidence points to a return to its insurgent roots. This seems to be corroboratedby the group’s current increasing resort to terrorism and guerrilla tactics. Lastly, we arguethat it is still premature to either claim the rebirth of the IS or to declare its demise.This article discusses the strategic shifts that the Islamic State (IS) has implemented in order to survive, especially in what regards its propaganda and military tactics. We argue that, for a long time now and in both domains, the IS and its predecessors have been flexible and resilient enough to adapt to new realities on the ground being able to shape and reshape its strategy and tactics towards its enemies’ capabilities and policies. In terms of propaganda, despite a decrease of its online presence, the IS has struggled to adapt some of its main narratives to the new reality brought about by the beginning of the international coalition attacks. However, evidence seems to suggest that the group will likely be able to maintain its online relevance yet for some time. Regarding its military tactics in Syria and Iraq, history and current evidence points to a return to its insurgent roots. This seems to be corroborated by the group’s current increasing resort to terrorism and guerrilla tactics. Lastly, we argue that it is still premature to either claim the rebirth of the IS or to declare its demise