Construing disordered minds as disordered brains : an alternative approach to mental pathology

A prevalent feature of philosophical and psychiatric theories which seek to clarify concepts of mental disorder is a growing allegiance to naturalism and biological functionalism. More recently this has culminated in what has been referred to as ‘evolutionary-theoretic’ approaches (for example, Papineau, 1994; Bolton and Hill, 1996; Wakefield, 1997). Generally, such approaches proffer, or rely upon, a exploration of psychological disorder in terms of cognitive dysfunction which is determined, at root, by evolutionary ideas of naturally selected biological functions. It is argued here that all such attempts must ultimately fail since they depend upon intentionally assigned normativity (to deliver and determine notions of correctness of function, etc.) derived from naturally selected teleological functions. It will be shown that teleologically assigned biological functionally only appears to delivery naturalised normativity by, in the first place, tacitly assuming intentional attributes. Alternatives are also explored, in particular ‘teleology-free’ systemic-capacity functions, but these are also shown to be inadequate. The proposed upshot is that any naturalising explanation of mental disorder as psychological dysfunction determined by evolutionary-based natural norms will fail to be conceptually viable. It therefore seems doubtful, at least, that an evolutionary approach will enable a theoretic reduction of disordered minds to disordered brains. An alternative approach is offered in which mental disorder is characterised, not as a departure from biologically encoded function, but as a condition of human experience and value. It is argued here that being an essentially non-reductive experiential concept does not, on this account, distinguish mental disorder from somatic illness although it is distinct from causal elements which may subsequently be individuated as disease entities. Experiential characterisation of mental disorder is further explained as a particular case of ‘radical’ irrationality, distinct from other instances. It is suggested that this may be a pertinent and defining feature of psychological disorders and, on this account, a subject for further examination.