In defence of telling the truth to patients with dementia

In this bioethics’ paper, I oppose the arguments justifying lying and deceiving persons with dementia fortheir good or out of compassion. The goals achieved by lying and deception should be achieved in otherways. However, although in some extraordinary cases, a medical professional or caregiver can departfrom the veracity rule, this cannot lead to the invalidation of truth-telling, being a conditio sine qua nonof the respect for patient`s dignity. In addition, the consequentialist argument that says that a personwith dementia, while losing his or her discernment of the world, cannot be harmed when becoming theaddressee of a lie is wrong. I argue that accepting deception is not only paternalist and contradictory tothe principle of respect for patients but also harms the dignity of the caregiver community or care homesinstitutions. If a dementia patient is not able to take care of his or her status as an adult and a personworthy of respect, this task should be taken over all the more by caregivers. This is because dignity isa social value, constituted in social interactions (shared dignity). Truthfulness is often a harder choice tomake, however, it should be given priority for the sake of human dignity, as well as for the authenticityof the personal relations among those who provide care to the patient — at home or in a care home.Avoiding the easier choice, which deception often is, requires an effort to build the communication skillsnecessary to give bad news in the least harmful way possible