A PHILOSOPHICAL RECAP OF THE NOTION OF SEMANTIC VALUE: AN ARGUMENT FOR SEMANTIC FOUNDATIONALISM AND A REVIEW OF THE PRAGMATIC FOUNDATION OF CONSENSUS PRODUCTION

This paper is an assessment of the scientific role of the study of semantics to represent the technical types of consensus produced in human practice. We propose that "meaning" should not be understood as a projection of success, canonized as an absolute rational method; but rather as a series of strategies of meaning, which develop circularly in the historical sphere of communication. With this we intend to bring up the problem of meaning outside the comfortable sphere of a simple, synchronic and a-historical line between meaning and pseudo-meaning. In the conclusion we will reach a reflective take on the philosophical spaces where the problem of meaning is conciliated to the problem of consensus and its formation, and then we will suggest a philosophical reflection on “failure” to mean. Among these philosophical spaces of reflection, we will discuss transcendentalism and dogmatism, and suggest the question on whether semantics can escape these so to speak atavistic patterns of philosophical expression