In Group Duties, Stephanie Collins proposes a ‘tripartite’ social ontology of groups as obligation-bearers. Producing a unified theory of group obligations that reflects our messy social reality is challenging and this ‘three-sizes-fit-all’ approach promises clarity but does not always keep that promise. I suggest considering the epistemic level as primary in determining collective obligations, allowing for more fluidity than the proposed tripartite ontology of collectives, coalitions and combinations
Individualists claim that collective obligations are reducible to the individual obligations of the ...
We often credit groups with reasoning well. Juries can be diligent, or committees negligent. We even...
In recent decades, concepts of group agency and the morality of groups have increasingly been discus...
In Group Duties, Stephanie Collins proposes a ‘tripartite’ social ontology of groups as obligation-b...
In Group Duties, Stephanie Collins proposes a ‘tripartite’ social ontology of groups as obligation-b...
Moral duties are regularly attributed to groups. We might think that the United Kingdom has a moral ...
Does ?ought? imply ?can? for collectives' obligations? In this paper I want to establish two things....
In this paper I discuss a number of different relationships between two kinds of (moral) obligation:...
We propose a new account of collective moral obligation. We argue that several agents have a moral o...
Stephanie Collins’ Group Duties offers interesting new arguments and brings together numerous interc...
In ordinary discourse, a single duty is often attributed to a plurality of agents. In Group Duties: ...
In section one, I outline developments in the social epistemology of science. With this, I locate my...
Individualists claim that collective obligations are reducible to the individual obligations of the ...
We often credit groups with reasoning well. Juries can be diligent, or committees negligent. We even...
In recent decades, concepts of group agency and the morality of groups have increasingly been discus...
In Group Duties, Stephanie Collins proposes a ‘tripartite’ social ontology of groups as obligation-b...
In Group Duties, Stephanie Collins proposes a ‘tripartite’ social ontology of groups as obligation-b...
Moral duties are regularly attributed to groups. We might think that the United Kingdom has a moral ...
Does ?ought? imply ?can? for collectives' obligations? In this paper I want to establish two things....
In this paper I discuss a number of different relationships between two kinds of (moral) obligation:...
We propose a new account of collective moral obligation. We argue that several agents have a moral o...
Stephanie Collins’ Group Duties offers interesting new arguments and brings together numerous interc...
In ordinary discourse, a single duty is often attributed to a plurality of agents. In Group Duties: ...
In section one, I outline developments in the social epistemology of science. With this, I locate my...
Individualists claim that collective obligations are reducible to the individual obligations of the ...
We often credit groups with reasoning well. Juries can be diligent, or committees negligent. We even...
In recent decades, concepts of group agency and the morality of groups have increasingly been discus...