We investigate experimentally whether subjects can learn, from their limited experiences, about relationships between the distribution of votes in a group and associated voting powers in weighted majority voting systems (WMV). Subjects are asked to play two-stage games repeatedly. In the second stage of the game, a group of four subjects bargains over how to divide fixed amount of resources among themselves through theWMV determined in the first stage. In the first stage, two out of four subjects in the group, independently and simultaneously, choose from two options that jointly determine the distribution of a given number of votes among four members. These two subjects face a 2 × 2 matrix that shows the distribution of votes, but not asso...
Vote trading is ubiquitous in committees and legislatures, and yet we know very little about its pro...
WP 2006-22 October 2006JEL Classification Codes: C91; C92; D64; D72; H41Recent papers show that in g...
Vote trading is ubiquitous in committees and legislatures, and yet we know very little about its pro...
We investigate experimentally whether subjects can learn, from their limited experiences, about rela...
We investigate experimentally whether subjects can learn, from their limited experiences, about rela...
We investigate experimentally whether subjects can learn, from their limited experiences, about rela...
We investigate experimentally whether subjects can learn, from their limited experiences, about rela...
We conducted a sensitivity analysis of results in weighted voting experiments by varying the followi...
We conducted a sensitivity analysis of results in weighted voting experiments by varying the followi...
We conducted a sensitivity analysis of results in weighted voting experiments by varying the followi...
We conducted a sensitivity analysis of the results of weighted voting experiments by varying two fea...
International audienceBy employing binary committee choice problems, this paper investigates how var...
The paper tests the theory of strategic voting for multiparty systems with proportional representati...
The paper tests the theory of strategic voting for multiparty systems with proportional representati...
The paper tests the theory of strategic voting for multiparty systems with proportional representati...
Vote trading is ubiquitous in committees and legislatures, and yet we know very little about its pro...
WP 2006-22 October 2006JEL Classification Codes: C91; C92; D64; D72; H41Recent papers show that in g...
Vote trading is ubiquitous in committees and legislatures, and yet we know very little about its pro...
We investigate experimentally whether subjects can learn, from their limited experiences, about rela...
We investigate experimentally whether subjects can learn, from their limited experiences, about rela...
We investigate experimentally whether subjects can learn, from their limited experiences, about rela...
We investigate experimentally whether subjects can learn, from their limited experiences, about rela...
We conducted a sensitivity analysis of results in weighted voting experiments by varying the followi...
We conducted a sensitivity analysis of results in weighted voting experiments by varying the followi...
We conducted a sensitivity analysis of results in weighted voting experiments by varying the followi...
We conducted a sensitivity analysis of the results of weighted voting experiments by varying two fea...
International audienceBy employing binary committee choice problems, this paper investigates how var...
The paper tests the theory of strategic voting for multiparty systems with proportional representati...
The paper tests the theory of strategic voting for multiparty systems with proportional representati...
The paper tests the theory of strategic voting for multiparty systems with proportional representati...
Vote trading is ubiquitous in committees and legislatures, and yet we know very little about its pro...
WP 2006-22 October 2006JEL Classification Codes: C91; C92; D64; D72; H41Recent papers show that in g...
Vote trading is ubiquitous in committees and legislatures, and yet we know very little about its pro...