General Tit-For-Tat Strategy in The Three Players Prisoner’s Dilemma Game

Tit-For-Tat Strategy which introduced by Robert Axelrod is a highly effective strategy in the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Most game theory research on the prisoner's dilemma has focused on two players, but it is possible to create a Prisoner’s Dilemma involving three or even more players. In this Paper, we discuss a prisoner's dilemma game involving three players which is infinitely iterated “iterated three player Prisoner’s Dilemma game (I3PD)”. The all possible strategies which depend on the previous outcomes are represented by finite state of automata. Four different new strategies are presented in order to discuss the general Tit-For-Tat concept in details, and we the compute the all payoff values for these strategies with the strategy ALLC and the strategy ALLD