Breve História da Intencionalidade, continuidade e rupturas a partir de Husserl

As fundamental concept of the descriptive analysis, intentionality allows the very opening of the phenomenological research field. What, then, is its definition? According to a generally admitted interpretation, intentionality would be the property of consciousness to be directed to something. Despite being commonsensical, this definition falters if we consider, for instance, the Aristotelian roots of the concept retrieved by Brentano in terms of “intentional presence”. The same applies to Heidegger, insofar as the factual dimension of existence gives rise to a new interpretation of intentionality in terms of “care”. Even Husserl does not grant a standard definition: intentionality, in the Logical Investigations, applies to the sphere of the acts of consciousness, without, however, encompassing the totality of the psychic life; and after the transcendental stage, intentionality is redefined on the basis of a structural ambivalence as objectifying intentionality or operational intentionality. It is therefore the history of phenomenology itself that is at stake in this brief sketch that we would like to draft throughout the history of intentionality: phenomenology, that is, a method – not a doctrine – that moves forward by accumulation of its results at the cost of a deep ambiguity of its fundamental concepts. Intentionality, consciousness, psychic life, thematic and operational concepts