Negative Transfer of Training: Simulator Study Into Effects of Going Beyond Alarms During Stall Recovery Training

FAA Technical Libraryhttps://doi.org/10.21949/15244742022PDFTech ReportLandman, A.Mol, DEmmerik, MLvan, Groen, ELNetherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research (TNO), Human PerformanceUnited States. Federal Aviation Administration. Aircraft Certification ServiceUnited States. Department of Transportation. Federal Aviation Administration. William J. Hughes Technical CenterUnited States. Federal Aviation Administration. Policy and Innovation DivisionUnited States. Department of Transportation. Federal Aviation AdministrationUnited StatesTrainingTechnology transferSimulationAir pilotsPsychological aspectsAviation safetyPilot behaviorAlarmsDOT/FAA/TC-22/10An often-used practice in pilot simulator training is to let pilots respond to a situation that has gone wrong. This may require the trainee to postpone their intervention, so that they can experience the cues and sensations signaling the critical situation, and have an opportunity to practice the appropriate response. However, some aviation-training experts have raised concerns about this practice. They argue that it might cause negative transfer of training when pilots suppress responses to alerts. These experts suggested that it is better to only train situations in which pilots immediately respond to situations going wrong. This study tested whether these two approaches to stall recovery training differently affect the learning and performance of pilots. Commercial airline pilots (N = 40) practiced stall recoveries for 30 minutes in the Desdemona flight simulator, which has a representative aerodynamic model and an extended motion envelope suitable for stall cueing. One group of pilots recovered from training scenarios that started in pause at the moment of the required response (Freeze group), while another group manually flew the aircraft into the stalls, going beyond alarms (Dynamic group). Before and after the training, pilots performed a stall recovery test that was not surprising. Other actively flown post-tests included a surprising ground proximity warning, a surprising stall, and a false stall alarm. In an additional post-test, the pilots\u2019 ability to recognize stall cues was tested in six passive situations of true and false stalls, and pilots had to indicate whether the presented situation involved a stall or not. An extensive number of stall recovery performance parameters and other behavioral parameters was tested.133