Risk sharing among banks helps them diversify idiosyncratic risks, but their interbank borrowing costs can become more volatile and bring financial fragility. Banks facing liquidity shortages need to pay an extra cost of credit when their lenders have bargaining powers, which depends on the likelihood of fire-sale and the fire-sale price discount. Risk sharing can decrease likelihood of liquidity shortage and lower the borrowing cost. However, the fire-sale discount increases, since joint distress arises and more assets are liquidated simultaneously. Though the interbank borrowing cost decreases with risk sharing, it may become more sensitive to changes in aggregate uncertainty.N
We develop a theoretical model where a redistribution of bank capital (e.g., due to reckless trading...
Some have argued that recent increases in credit risk transfer are desirable because they improve th...
Recent struggles in \u85nancial markets have drawn attention to the role of se-cured credit for lend...
Risk sharing among banks helps them diversify idiosyncratic risks, but their interbank borrowing cos...
Some stylized facts about transactions among banks are not easily reconciled with coinsurance of sho...
This paper studies banksdecision whether to borrow from the interbank market or to sell assets in or...
Increasing numbers of inter-bank lending relationships have an ambiguous effect on financial stabili...
In the absence of taxes, imperfect information, and importantly, additional regulation, the an-swer ...
The interplay between liquidity and credit risks in the interbank market is analyzed. Banks are hit...
We study the functioning and possible breakdown of the interbank market in the presence of counterpa...
The interplay between liquidity and credit risks in the interbank market is analyzed. Banks are hit...
We develop a theoretical interbank market (IBM) model which explains a number of facts observed duri...
This article analyzes the reward for the risk embedded in interbank derivatives, seeking to characte...
We study the functioning of secured and unsecured interbank markets in the pres-ence of credit risk....
We develop a theoretical model where a redistribution of bank capital (e.g., due to reckless trading...
We develop a theoretical model where a redistribution of bank capital (e.g., due to reckless trading...
Some have argued that recent increases in credit risk transfer are desirable because they improve th...
Recent struggles in \u85nancial markets have drawn attention to the role of se-cured credit for lend...
Risk sharing among banks helps them diversify idiosyncratic risks, but their interbank borrowing cos...
Some stylized facts about transactions among banks are not easily reconciled with coinsurance of sho...
This paper studies banksdecision whether to borrow from the interbank market or to sell assets in or...
Increasing numbers of inter-bank lending relationships have an ambiguous effect on financial stabili...
In the absence of taxes, imperfect information, and importantly, additional regulation, the an-swer ...
The interplay between liquidity and credit risks in the interbank market is analyzed. Banks are hit...
We study the functioning and possible breakdown of the interbank market in the presence of counterpa...
The interplay between liquidity and credit risks in the interbank market is analyzed. Banks are hit...
We develop a theoretical interbank market (IBM) model which explains a number of facts observed duri...
This article analyzes the reward for the risk embedded in interbank derivatives, seeking to characte...
We study the functioning of secured and unsecured interbank markets in the pres-ence of credit risk....
We develop a theoretical model where a redistribution of bank capital (e.g., due to reckless trading...
We develop a theoretical model where a redistribution of bank capital (e.g., due to reckless trading...
Some have argued that recent increases in credit risk transfer are desirable because they improve th...
Recent struggles in \u85nancial markets have drawn attention to the role of se-cured credit for lend...